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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Federal 
Coordinating Officer (FCO) function is examined as it relates to Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) operations. It is suggested that targeted changes can 
be made to ensure the FCOs are better prepared to manage the additional complexities of 
a CBRN environment.  The changes include addressing the FCOs from the systems 
approach- internally to improve the FCO personal and professional development; external 
organizational design to improve the FCO’s cross-jurisdictional operating environment; 
and agency support changes to provide the FCOs with additional CBRN staffing 
expertise to aid in managing the complexity.  If the recommendations herein are adopted, 
the critical command and control function of the FCO in a CBRN environment will be 
substantially enhanced and the readiness level of the federal response system greatly 
improved. 
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In October 2007, the President of the United States released the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security.  The purpose of the strategy is to guide, organize, and unify the 
nation’s homeland security efforts.1  One of the main challenges identified in the strategy 
is the need to continue and strengthen efforts to achieve full unity of effort through a 
stronger and further integrated national approach to homeland security.2 
Written in support of the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the tenants 
and themes of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) five-year strategic 
plan, the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), Professional Development Plan (PDP) is 
designed to promote the development of the best leaders in the United States 
government.3  The Federal Coordinating Officers have a prominent role in helping the 
agency (DHS/FEMA) accomplish its core missions of saving lives, preventing suffering, 
protecting property, and conducting recovery operations.4  Furthermore, the PDP 
provides the framework for FCOs to acquire, build, and refine the skills needed to be 
successful in today’s environment of increasing frequency and destructiveness of 
disasters (to include CBRN), growing public expectations, and added pressures to reduce 
disaster costs.5   
In the current context, the national strategic plan and the FCO PDP both define 
requirements, objectives, and goals for FEMA and the FCO cadre respectively, but the 
intersection of the two with specific processes as it relates to a CBRN terrorist attack is 
not clear.  This thesis will focus on the Federal Coordinating Officer in the designated 
                                                 
1 White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2002), I. 
2 Ibid., 7. 
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Coordinating Officer: Professional Development 




role of senior leader in the field and address the training, readiness, organization, and 
support mechanisms that are required to ensure the FCOs are prepared to lead a field 
response in a CBRN environment consistent with the dictums of the FCO Professional 
Develop Plan in support of the FEMA Strategic Plan and the National Strategy. 
1. An Examination of the Position of Federal Coordinating Officer 
(FCO) 
The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) is a unique senior leader position within 
the federal government structure.  There is no guidebook or checklist to show a person 
what constitutes being an effective FCO.  The measurement of the effectiveness of the 
FCO is purely from operational and tactical results as measured by the effectiveness their 
ability to provide disaster-related services to the victims via the state and local emergency 
response and recovery structures. 
Historically, FCOs have been senior FEMA Regional Division Directors who 
were appointed by the President of the United States to manage a disaster.  The appointee 
would leave his/her office to manage the disaster, often remaining on the scene for 
upwards of three, six, or even twelve months.  This scenario presented a tremendous 
strain on both the individual, whose work accumulated on the office desk, and also on the 
FEMA regions as key leaders were pulled away for extended periods of time and were 
unable to manage their divisional responsibly while away. 
The concept of a full-time, dedicated cadre of FCOs to manage disasters, from 
cradle to grave without having direct in-region responsibilities, was introduced in 1999.  
Congress provided the authority for twenty-five full-time, excepted service positions to 
be allocated to FEMA for duties as FCOs.  These individuals were chosen from various 
backgrounds where they had exhibited superior leadership and decision-making skills.  
This collection of professionals became the foundation of the FCO cadre as it is designed 
today.  
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Immediately and upon his declaration of a major disaster or emergency, the 
President (of the United States) shall appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer to operate in 
the affected area.6  The provision goes further to delineate the four primary 
responsibilities of the FCO, who shall: 
• Make an initial appraisal of the types of relief most urgently needed; 
• Establish such field offices as he deems necessary and as authorized by the 
President; 
• Coordinate the administration of relief, including activities of the state and 
local governments, the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the 
Mennonite Disaster Service, and other relief or disaster assistance 
organizations, which agree to operate under his advice or direction. 
• Take such other action, consistent with authority delegated to him by the 
President, and consistent with the provisions of this chapter, as he may 
deem necessary to assist local citizens and public officials in promptly 
obtaining assistance to which they are entitles.7 
From the above four denoted responsibilities, all other actions required to 
effectively manage a disaster situation are also implied. In the final analysis, once 
appointed by the President, responsibility for all the occurrences with all aspects of the 
federal response and support to state and local officials begin and end with the Federal 
Coordinating Officer.  This fact extends to all hazards to which the FCO may be 
assigned.  This could be nominal floods or tornados, which are for the most part 
commonly occurring events.  
As a mater of public record, in fiscal year (FY) 2007 the president declared  63 
major disasters for such occurrences as hurricanes, floods, tornados, wildfires, etc.8  This 
number represents an interesting trend.  From FY 1953 to FY 2008 the average number 
of declared disasters per year was 32, but when aggregating the most recent years, FY 
                                                 
6 War and National Defense, US Code 50, Title 42, Sec. 2301, para 5143 (2003) 
http://vlex.com/vid/19266381 (accessed October 5, 2008). 
7 War and National Defense, US Code 50. 
8 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Annual Major Disaster Declaration Totals” FEMA, 
www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema (accessed October 7, 2008). 
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1996 to FY 2008, the number of declared disasters was 55.8.9  The last year on record 
where the number of declared presidential disasters was only 32 was in 1995.10  Every 
year since then, the number of disasters declared has exceeded 32; and 1996 was the year 
with the most presidential declared disasters; in that year, 75 were declared.11 
The complex nature of the FCO position is evident from the discussion above. 
These same individuals who are appointed to lead the federal disaster response, with the 
modern-day average of 55.8 disasters per year, would now be appointed by the President 
of the United States to manage the federal response to a CBRN event also.  This would be 
another intense level of complexity added to an already complex array of responsibilities. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism written in September 2006, stated 
that “we [The United States] will prepare ourselves for possible WMD (CBRN) incidents 
by developing capabilities to manage the range of consequences that may result from 
such an attack against the United States or our interests around the world.”12  In the face 
of American dominance in traditional forms of warfare, terrorists are seeking to acquire 
catastrophic capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction (and CBRN). The 
proliferation of WMD/CBRN technology and expertise makes contending with 
catastrophic challenges an urgent priority (for the government of the United States).13  
The threat to the nation from an attack using CBRN is real and present.  Finally, despite 
the nation’s best deterrent and mitigation efforts, terrorists attacks will happen, and 
officials must work to minimize the consequences of their occurrences.14 
                                                 
9 FEMA, “Annual Major Disaster Declaration Totals.” 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006), 
15. 
13 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States (Washington D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 2005), 3. 
14 White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 30. 
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The core of the United States’ efforts to minimize the consequences (from CBRN 
attacks) lies with a comprehensive approach for responding to and recovering from such 
incidents.15  The tangible and effective work to actually put words into action and 
minimize and reduce the consequences of a CBRN attack on United States soil should 
include all response and recovery stakeholders, but the FCO, as the lead federal manager 
during a declared disaster, is in a pivotal position affecting the success of the operations 
as a whole.   
One of the primary goals of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) Strategic Plan (FY 08- FY 13) is investing in people and that people will invest 
in FEMA to ensure mission success.16  It further advocates for an educated and 
experienced workforce that understands FEMA’s multiple mission areas (of which 
CBRN response and recovery is paramount) and promotes the integration of FEMA 
programs and service.17  The Federal Coordinating Officers are the agency’s primary 
conduit in the field to ensure those multiple missions are integrated with state and local 
partners and are ultimately achieved. 
In March 2008, the Office of the Federal Coordinating Officer Operations, which 
is the office in FEMA directly under the FEMA Administrator that manages the day to 
day activities and assignments of the FCOs, developed a draft developmental document 
called the Federal Coordinating Officer, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and 
High Explosive (CBRN-E) Tiered Qualifications Plan (TQP).18   The necessity to 
develop a FCO specific TQP that addressed CBRN directly was a realization that some 
other training and developmental activities in the CBRN arena other than what is 
currently being provided was required.  This thesis seeks to examine this realization and 
to further investigate the following assertion inferred by the need to commission a TQP, 
                                                 
15 White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 30. 
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Strategic Plan for FY 08-13” (initial draft for review, 
FEMA, Washington, D.C., 2007), 2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 The FCO TQP is currently under final review and implementation.  It provides for a systematic 
process to ensure the FCO Cadre is equipped with the requisite core-competencies to manage operations in 
a CBRN environment. 
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to effectively manage large complex inter-organizational entities and collaboratively 
operate in a CBRN environment, Federal Coordinating Officers require skill sets and core 
competencies that are not being identified or promoted at any consistent level. Other 
important research questions include, do CBRN events require leaders to have unique 
specialized training, awareness, and education, which should be identified and addressed 
prior to having to confront such an environment?  Is the current design and structure of 
the FCO cadre’s response to CBRN events consistent with the goals of the various 
national plans and strategies discussed?   
C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will examine the complexities of a CBRN environment and what 
makes those complexities unique to manage from a Federal Coordinating Officer 
perspective. The key research question is:  
How should the preparation, education, training, and organization of FEMA 
Federal Coordinating Officers be modified to ensure their success in CBRN events? 
In order to fully engage this most salient research question, the thesis will 
endeavor to examine the nature of the FCO cadre and the essence of senior leadership in 
a CBRN environment from the following key perspectives. 
• Tactical and Operational 
The tactical and operational concerns highlight what is being done at the 
first responder and follow-on forces levels.  When addressing these two 
levels of response the focus tend to represent how policy and doctrine are 
put into action in the field.  How is operating in a CBRN environment 
different?  What key aspects of the environment will have a greater impact 
on critical decision making by the FCOs?  What tactical and operational 
changes are required to increase efficiencies? 
• Legal Implications 
The federal government is taking a more proactive role in overall disaster 
management.  As the federal government moves to take a more prominent 
role in CBRN response, what are the implications for the responders and, 
in particular, the FCOs?  Will these legal nuances affect the way the FCOs 




• Media and Society 
There appears to be a link between the media and societal attitude.  The 
recent 2008 Presidential election demonstrated the power of the media to 
influence the public.  The media reported more favorably on the democrat 
candidate and thus had more positive stories on that candidate.  By a 
margin of 70 percent-9 percent Americans say most journalists want to see 
Obama, not John McCain, win.19 Did the seemly slanted reporting by the 
media shape public opinion?  If so, then can the slant also be applied to 
CBRN? The ability of the media to shape societal opinions is also true in 
the foreign policy arena.  The public’s actual opinions arise from framed 
information (by the media), from selected highlights of events (by the 
media), issues, and problems rather than from direct contact with the 
realities of foreign affairs (and domestic CBRN).20 How will this media 
control of public opinion affect the FCO in a CBRN environment?  What 
can the FCO do to control or manage the media?  What assets are at the 
disposal of the FCO to use toward the goal of effective media 
management? 
In addition, the research will examine the complexity of response and recovery as 
it relates to the FCOs and CBRN.  While FCOs are involved in disaster declarations in 
both response and recovery on almost a daily basis, the complexities of CBRN are 
different and require a different set of competencies to manage.  Even compared with the 
weapons of conventional terrorism, such as fire arms and high-yield explosives, CBRN 
weapons are particularly effective agents of terror and the terror-producing features of 
these agents must be understood and anticipated by clinicians and front-line responders.21 
The methodologies of centralized leadership and decentralized leadership will be 
compared and contrasted in a CBRN response.  Which approach is more appropriate in a 
CBRN environment?  How does each affect the FCO? 
A chapter in the research is devoted to a survey of the FCOs.  The survey is 
included to record the perceptions and concerns of the FCOs themselves.  The survey is a 
powerful tool used to garner information on FCO CBRN skill set and competency status 
                                                 
19 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Most Voters Say News Media Wants Obama to 
Win,” News Interest Index, Pew Research Center (October 22, 2008) http://people-
press.org/report/463/media-wants-obama (accessed November 26, 2008). 
20 Robert Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 123. 
21 Steven Crimando, “The Bio-Psycho-Social Consequences of Terrorism,” Supplement to New Jersey 
Medicine 101, no. 9 (2004): 84. 
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as well as future developmental requirements.  From this first order data collection, 
certain assumption can be made.  Assumptions such as how well the FCOs feel they are 
now capable to respond effectively to a CBRN event.  What do the FCOs feel their 
shortfalls are as related to a CBRN response? 
The thesis goes further to make specific recommendations based on the surveys 
and researched information gathered.  The recommendations are presented as tangible 
solutions to improving the state of readiness of the FCOs in CBRN environments. In 
summation, what this thesis does is to pull information from various sources, the federal 
government, the emergency management field, academia, the private sector, and the 
FCOs.  From a compilation of the data a coherent path forward is provided. 
D. HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to address an important homeland security 
issue from the perspective of the lead federal manager, the FCO, who will be responsible 
for the federal support to state and local officials and to identify concrete steps that can be 
taken to achieve a greater degree of unity and effectiveness between all stakeholders 
responding to a CBRN event.  In accomplishing this important purpose, the current state 
of FCO CBRN training and readiness must be ascertained, the certainty of the uniqueness 
of CBRN environment to other disaster environments established, and the nature of 
organizational complexity vis a vis the FCO and CBRN detailed.  After the elements of 
these key subsets are researched and codified, a more effective CBRN modality for 
FEMA in general and the FCO specifically can be developed and implemented.  
This thesis will add clarity to the dilemma of senior level leadership and 
management in CBRN environments that has up to this juncture been largely 
unexamined.  In Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the Secretary of 
the Department of Homeland Security  is responsible to administer a National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) to provide for a consistent nationwide approach for federal, 
state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from domestic incidents (including CBRN), regardless of cause, 
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size, or complexity.22  The work presented herein will illuminate why there is a 
distinction between the size and complexity of CBRN events and normal disaster 
environments and will advocate a future strategy of targeted awareness and competency 
building for those Federal Coordinating Officers (FCO) with a high probability of being 
faced with managing staff in CBRN environments.   
E. RESEARCH AUDIENCE 
The immediate consumer of the information herein is the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s senior leaders, other federal agencies’ senior leaders, principal 
federal officials, and state and local senior response and emergency managers.  This 
thesis will illustrate the current status of the FCO CBRN leadership/management 
environment as well as recommend a path forward that will bolster the operational 
readiness at the various jurisdiction levels in which the FCO interfaces. 
The thesis will have a significant value to the homeland security national 
leadership posture by identifying significant deficiencies in the current level of readiness 
within the system, structure, and personnel as it pertains to CBRN events.  The thesis will 
also examine a central, key function during a disaster, the Federal Coordinating Officer, 
and offer substantive insight as to what improvements can be made to ensure greater 
efficiencies in CBRN environments.  
                                                 
22 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 (Washington, D.C.: White 
House, 2003), 3. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
There is not a great amount of literature that focuses on the competencies required 
for Federal Coordinating Officer cadre to manage operations during a CBRN attack in the 
United States. Perhaps a good reason for this condition is that there have only been 
sporadic cases of such events and only on a relatively small scale. The 2001 anthrax 
attacks revealed the nation’s vulnerabilities and suggested that a more widespread attack 
would have more serious consequences for the ability of this nation to function.23   If 
these events were to be multiplied in their intensity and numbers, the core competencies 
of the national leadership would surely be tested.  Authorities who contemplate how to 
respond to biological (nuclear, chemical and radiological also) attacks should base their 
plans on lessons from experiences in the broader sense; they should not consider their 
responsibilities and charge a completely novel task.24   
Within FEMA, the same structure that now responds to commonplace disasters 
such as hurricanes and tornados, will also be responding to CBRN events. The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security detailed certain key challenges to homeland security and 
beyond.  One major challenge revealed is the fact that terrorist have declared their 
intention to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (CBRN) to inflict 
catastrophic attacks against the United States and its allies, partners, and other interests.25  
This thesis seeks to examine a key function in the federal response and recovery 
apparatus to such an attack, the Federal Coordinating Officer, who is the President of the 
United States’ appointed representative in support of the state during disaster  
                                                 
23 National Research Council of the National Academics, Reopening Public Facilities after a 
Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework (Washington, DC: National Press, 2005), vii. 
24 Ibid., 9. 
25 White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 6. 
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declarations, and determine if additional attention or approaches to training and 
organization will make the FCO better prepared to manage the consequences of a CBRN 
terrorists attack on American soil. 
In today’s world, America and its assets, both inside and outside the continental 
United States are rich targets for CBRNE attacks.26    Because of this threat, key 
emergency response areas of concern are addressed in this thesis.  These areas include:  
pre-event CBRN environments and what makes such an environment unique for 
managers; tactical and operational requirements; authorities and policies on the federal 
response and why the federal government has to be ready to act in such environments; 
legal oversight; political and societal relations; and media interactions.   
1. Pre-Event CBRN Environments 
There is much literature written on the effects inherent in a CBRN environment, 
just as much information is available for the more common hurricanes, floods, or 
earthquakes which are traditional disaster situations in the United States.  Yet there is 
very little information available specifically for senior federal leaders, such as the FCOs, 
to be able to read, digest, and become better prepared for CBRN leadership duties. With 
that being noted, many and various general publications/documents detail processes and 
procedure for operating in CBRN environments, and some suggest the same principles 
will work in all atypical situations.  For instance, the Nuclear Weapons Response 
Procedures Manual (NARP) provides a concept of operations as well as functional 
information necessary to execute a comprehensive and unified response to a nuclear 
weapon accident.27   It is suggested therein that some of those same concepts, once 
learned, can be leveraged for chemical or biological environments as well.  In addition 
the National Response Plan (NRP) contains a Terrorism Annex and a 
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex amplified by a base text that addresses key 
                                                 
26 USAF Counter proliferation Center, “Final Report: Asymmetric Warfare Workshop: Fighting the 
Base; Protecting the Force,” from Asymmetric Warfare Workshop, McLean, VA, January 17-18, 2006, 4. 
27 Department of Defense, Nuclear Weapons Response Procedures Manual: NARP, DoDD 3120.08- 
M (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2005), 2. 
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command and control aspects of a CBRN attack.28  These two documents were replaced 
by the National Response Framework (NRF) in January 2008, but both the Terrorism 
Annex and the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex still have valuable utility for the 
responders.  In particular, the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex provides an 
acknowledgment of the unique nature of a variety of nuclear/radiological incidents and 
the subsequent responsibilities of federal, state, local, and tribal governments in 
responding to them.29  
2. The Ever-Present and Emerging Threat 
There exist several unclassified and easy to obtain publications that examine and 
detail just how easy it is to attack the United States using atypical weaponry. For 
instance, a manual for the production of an al-Mubtakkar, a crude hydrogen cyanide 
dispersal device, has been reproduced on numerous al-Qaeda websites since late 2005.30   
Since very little is done in the way of internet or publication monitoring and/or 
censorship, this information is readily available to those willing to attack the United 
States.  This fact was brought to light when the before mentioned al-Mubtakkar, which 
again was found on the internet, appears to be nearly identical to the device intended for 
use in the aborted 2003 plot to attack the New York City subway system with chemical 
weapons (CW). 31 These types of easily manufactured dangerous environments can be 
created quickly and the consequences differ from nominal disasters both in scope and 
intensity. Therefore, it is essential to expand the scope of knowledge of all emergency 
responders concerning chemical and biological agents in order to be prepared to operate 
                                                 
28 The Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (2004) has been superseded by the 
National Response Framework (2008), but the Terrorism and the Nuclear/Radiological Annexes still 
provide valuable baseline information for CBRN operations that will benefit responders. 
29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex,” in National 
Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2004), NUC-2. 
30 Sammy Salama, “Special Report: Manual for Producing Chemical Weapon to be used in New York 
Subway Plot Available on Al-Qaeda Websites since Late 2005” (Monterey, CA: Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, 2006), 1. 
31 Ibid. 
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safely and effectively should the need arise.32 Although there have been few terrorist acts 
involving CBRN agents to date, intelligence agencies in the United States and abroad 
continue to warn that terrorist groups repeatedly have attempted to acquire or 
manufacture these weapons.33  
3. The Tactical and Operational CBRN Environment 
A look at the tactical aspects of CBRN is found in some of the basic doctrine 
primarily produced by the military, which does have a history of preparing for CBRN 
attacks. Doctrine such as United States Marine Corps Order 3500.70 has some aspects 
that can be vetted for its applicability to civilian senior leader implementation.  The 
purpose of the manual is to promulgate training polices, procedures, and standards for 
NBCD (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense) specialists and officers who will 
assist in maintaining a high level of combat readiness.34 This is precisely what could be 
helpful for the FCO cadre and other senior civilian CBRN leaders, yet such 
comprehensive manuals have yet to be developed for their use.  
The same will hold true for the operational assessment. Both military and civilian 
organizations are just beginning to attempt to shape a consensus on the CBRN 
operational landscape due to a terrorists attack.  Institutions such as the University of 
South Florida have been doing excellent work in defining some CBRN operational 
parameters.  Operational tools such as the WMD Agent Quick Reference Guide are 
useful, handy pocket resources in the hands of senior leaders.35  Yet, the extreme 
technical nature of the guide may be too detailed for the FCO to be able to use 
effectively. Nevertheless by looking at such literature some operational concepts can be 
introduced that are not widely used in normal disaster environments. This is a primary, 
                                                 
32 John Medici and Steve Patrick, “Supplement 14: Emergency Response to Incidents Involving 
Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents,” in Hazardous Materials Response Handbook, 3rd ed. (Quincy, 
MA: NFPA, 1997), 2. 
33 Crimando, “The Bio-Psycho-Social Consequence of Terrorism,” 85. 
34 United States Marine Corps, “Order 3500.70,” in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense 
Training and Readiness Manual, C 469 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2004), 1. 
35 University of South Florida, Center for Biological Defense, “WMD Agent Quick Reference Guide: 
Biological/Chemical Agents,” www.bt.usf.edu (accessed November 14, 2008). 
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necessary step in the development of more effective FCO leadership for CBRN 
environments—to be able to borrow from the processes and polices that are already 
developed and apply them, where applicable, to the federal managerial role in CBRN 
events. 
4. Federal Authorities in CBRN Environments 
The authorities that an FCO will have in a CBRN environment are not as 
succinctly spelled out as one would hope, but with a careful exploration of some readily 
available documents and publications, a clearer picture can emerge. Legal authorities and 
the dissection between federal and state’s rights are always a concern in most disaster 
environments and it is expected to increase exponentially in a CBRN event.  The Stafford 
Act and the Domestic WMD Incident Management Legal Desk Book,36 which is the 
predominant book now used by military lawyers attending military law schools, are both 
basic documents for the FCO to read and understand.  
Other current literature tends to suggest much direct evidence that the federal 
government is assuming a more proactive role in the preparation, response, and recovery 
from attacks on the United States.  There seems to be a deliberate shift from the 
traditional process of being reactive and waiting for the states to exhaust all resources 
before engaging at the federal level.  The focus now is becoming more proactive.  The 
objective of the United States government is to ensure all levels of government across the 
nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national 
approach to incident management.37  An interpretation of that objective can suggest that 
by assuming this posture and stressing that the federal government is ultimately 
responsible, it de facto transfers the primary onus from state and local jurisdictions and 
places the responsibility on the federal government and, as the proxy the senior federal 
response manager, to the FCO.    Another such indication of this possible juxtaposition is 
imbedded in one of the four conditions for the federal government to utilize resources to 
                                                 
36 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Domestic WMD Incident Management Legal Desk Book, (Fort 
Belvoir, VA: DTRA, 2003). 
37 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directve/HSPD-5 (Washington, D.C.: White House, 
2003), 1. 
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recover from a terrorists attack; condition four states that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security [may be] directed to assume responsibly for managing the domestic incident by 
the President [of the United States] .38 This seems to imply that the President of the 
United States can unilaterally override the wishes of a governor and assume managerial 
control of a CBRN incident if the President so desires.  If this were to occur the FCO, as 
the President’s direct representative, would be placed in an unstable position as conflict 
between the federal and state leadership could arise. 
In addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Strategic Plan 
calls for the agency to be the nation’s preeminent emergency management agency, and to 
strengthen partnership and professionalize the national emergency management system.39  
Inherent in that approach is for FEMA to take a more prominent role in shaping the 
federal government’s and state and local jurisdictions’ emergency management posture. 
Of particular interest is a listed strategic objective within the  strategic framework  states 
that FEMA will  provide doctrinal and programmatic guidance to all levels of 
government and all external partners.40 
One of the main tenants of the National Response Framework (NRF) is a 
challenge to deliver effective emergency management in an environment of relatively 
high turnover and short tenure among elected and appointed officials responsible for 
incident management at all levels.41  This begins to establish the rationale for the federal 
government to exercise the option of federal (Presidential) control over a CBRN even 
within a state’s borders.  Since the state and local officials have a high turnover rate and 
short tenure, the argument could be made that the federal government has a greater 
capacity to respond and recover. 
                                                 
38 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directve/HSPD-5, (Washington, D.C.: White House, 
2003), 1. 
39 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Strategic Plan Initial Draft Framework 
(Washington, D.C.: FEMA, 2007), 1. 
40 Ibid., 7. 
41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Response Framework” (Pre-decisional and 
deliberate draft, Washington, D.C.: FEMA, 2007), 2. 
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Another realization of the federal government having more statutory authorities 
over state and local jurisdictions is found in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act of 2006-A Bill amending the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish the 
United States Emergency Management Authority and for other purposes.42   In Title I 
Section 101 (National Preparedness) the FEMA Administrator is directed to ensure state, 
regional, and local emergency preparedness by establishing minimum performance 
requirements for public and community preparedness.43  This clearly establishes the 
federal government’s oversight role, and since funding state and local equipment, 
training, and other emergency management endeavors is also attached to this relationship; 
it is becoming more solidified and institutionalized. 
5. Political and Societal Nature of a CBRN Event 
Politics and its intersection with society are ever present in even normal disaster 
situations.  The FCOs are constantly striving to satisfy the needs of the congressional 
delegation, which of course works for their constituency, the society at large. The 
literature suggests that due to the unique nature of a CBRN attack, the FCOs will have a 
much greater challenge in trying to ensure both the needs of the politicians and society 
are met. 
The one single document that is commonly available and shows the relationships 
between the various jurisdictions is the National Response Framework (NRF).44  With 
the recent initial release of this major publication, it is assumed that the political 
landscape is now clearer for the FCOs, but since the NRF has not been tested under a true 
catastrophe as yet, the document’s real validity is still undetermined, and until the NRF is 
proven effective in a CBRN event, questions in the minds of the responders may still be 
unanswered.  After reviewing the NRF, a senior state director had the following 
                                                 
42 110th United States Congress, “S.3721: Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006,” 
(reported to the Senate amended, August 3, 2006) 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?tab=summary&bill=s109-3721&page-command (accessed 
October 25, 2007). 
43 Congress, Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, 1. 
44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 3. 
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assessment “The current Framework is not a plan. The document reads more like a 
primer for state and local officials, which is a valuable resource, however not a national 
plan for responding to disasters.”45 
The strictly societal implications of a CBRN attack on a major city are difficult to 
define since it has not happened before. However, questions do persist as to the degree in 
which a modern American society could endure such an occurrence.  A look at the way 
society reacted to the events of Hurricane Katrina, found in the congressional report 
Failure of Initiative,46 along with the report from the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Failure of Imagination,47 are both potential mirrors into the psyche of American citizenry 
during disasters.  Probably the most poignant finding that encapsulates the current 
condition of American society was detailed in the Select Committee report, Failure of 
Initiative. The report noted in the response to Hurricane Katrina that the United States are 
still an analog government in a digital age.48  This is a terse way of saying that the 
systems in place to respond to events such as Hurricane Katrina are outdated and that also 
suggests the even more complex response environment of a CBRN event has a further 
gap in response capabilities.  This thesis will make recommendations that will transition 
the FCO cadre from the analog age to the digital age and beyond where CBRN response 
and recovery is concerned. 
6. Managing the Media in a CBRN Event 
The FCOs’ understanding of the media is important for a better awareness as to 
how the media galvanizes and what its main priorities are during disasters and, more 
importantly, in catastrophes like a CBRN event would be.  The media’s true role is to 
                                                 
45 New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, “NMDHSEM State 
Director Testifies on Capital Hill: Critiques on National Response Framework, 1, (September 11, 2007) 
http://newsroom.nmdhsem.org/cms/kunde/rts/newsroomnmdhsemorg/docs/712264230-09-18-2007-14-07-
18.htm (accessed November 13, 2008). 
46 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 
A Failure of Initiative, 109th Cong., 2d sess., 2005, Committee Print, 1. 
47 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
(Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 2004). 
48 Select Bipartisan Committee, Failure of Initiative Executive Summary, 1. 
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ensure there is preparedness to deal with disasters.49  There is an assertion that 
communications (between responding stakeholders) during a major disaster has not 
adequately improved (since Hurricane Katrina) and remains a critical issue requiring 
additional effort.50 These types of communications capabilities between the responders 
themselves, internal, and between the responders and the press, external, are sure to be 
tested in a CBRN response.  The media has two important functions: first, to ensure the 
government acts quickly in times of crisis and, secondly, to highlight success stories and 
enthuse those working in disaster areas.51 
What has changed since Hurricane Katrina and continues to evolve is the speed 
and modes in which information travels.  The rise of such data transfer vehicles, such as 
“Twitter,” is an example of this information evolution. Twitter is a service for friends, 
family, and co–workers to communicate and stay connected through the exchange of 
quick, frequent answers to simple questions.52  The utility of twitter as a disaster 
information tool was displayed on several occasions:  
Twitter users in Southern California during the wildfires used the tool to 
do local reporting for the benefit of neighbors. Even for people who were 
evacuated and didn't have a computer, they could follow the updates on 
their cell phones. Twitter users were also able to broadcast live updates on 
the Minnesota bridge collapse just minutes after it happened and before 
many news outlets could get the details out to the public.53   
In addition, the use of the cell phone video technology continues to improve.  It is 
now more likely that someone who has a cell phone capable of recording video or photos 
will be on the scene of a disaster before television crews arrive (and certainly before the  
 
                                                 
49 Sunil Jain, “The Media and Other Disasters” (at the International Conference on Total Disaster Risk 
Management, Kobe, Japan, December 2-4, 2003), 109. 
50 Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, “Getting the News Out in Time of Disaster,” Section 
19.42 in The Disaster Handbook- National Edition (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 1998), 1. 
51Jain, “The Media and Other Disasters,” 109. 
52 Twitter, “What is Twitter?”(2008) http://twitter.com (accessed November 14, 2008). 
53 Jennifer W. Maderazo, “Twitter Helps with Reporting, Filter the News,” Media Shift, (May 9, 
2008), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2008/05/twitter-helps-with-reporting-filtering-the-news130.html 
(accessed November 14, 2008). 
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first responders).  The results of this phenomenon are the potential for immediate and 
dramatic footage of disasters.54  This footage will be available to the worldwide media 
without vetting or sanitizing for content. 
The FCO and the Joint Field Office are on the front lines to mount a 
communications campaign both internal and external to ensure the proper message is 
being provided and that correct information is being given to the public to ensure 
protective actions can be taken in a timely manner. During Hurricane Katrina massive 
inoperability had the biggest effect on communications, limiting command and control, 
situational awareness, and federal, state, and local officials’ ability to address 
unsubstantiated media reports.55  To address such discrepancies in a CBRN environment, 
the FCO and the Joint Information Center’s (JIC) ability to be astute, viable, and nimble 
will have to emerge. 
B. SUMMARY 
The review of the literature that discusses the Federal Coordinating Officer’s 
(FCO) function and the various aspects of CBRN have sufficient material, but a clear 
understanding of how the FCO would function in a CBRN environment is not presented.  
What the literature does cover is an acknowledgement of the unique nature of a CBRN 
event, the present threat to the United States from terrorism is well-documented, the 
tactical and operational nature of CBRN and WMD is defined but only from a military 
perspective, and the societal implications of a CBRN attack on United States soil is well 
discussed.  The literature is less definitive of the legal implications of an attack and what 
that would mean for the various jurisdictions affected and the ability of the senior 
responders such as the FCOs to manage media affairs. 
Where the literature is lacking most however is in the defining of specific 
preparedness, response, and recovery principles and practices for the FCOs to 
successfully manage and lead in complex CBRN environments.  This thesis will do 
                                                 
54 Brian Houston, “Cell Phones, Disasters, and Youth,” The Prevention Researcher (September 25, 
2008) http://blog.tpronline.org/?p=73 (accessed November 14, 2008). 
55 Select Bipartisan Committee, Failure of Initiative Executive Summary, 3. 
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precisely that. It will examine the difficult functions of an FCO from the complexity of a 
CBRN attack.  The threat of a CBRN attack is real and is well-stated in this body of 
work, yet the current preparedness level of the FCOs to be ready to respond is in doubt 
because there are very little published processes and policies to guide them.  Identifying 
and embracing pragmatic measures that reduce the consequences of unexpected events 
[such as a CBRN terrorists attack] is not a defeatist position; it is the smart thing to do.56 
This thesis will further illuminate the key aspects and challenges facing the FCO in a 
CBRN environment, and it will offer a solution set toward more effective federal 
management in such events. 
                                                 
56 Stephen Flynn, “Preparing for the Worst,” in The Edge of Disaster (New York: Random House, 
2007), 154. 
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III. HOW CBRN ENVIRONMENTS DIFFER 
A. HOW CBRN ENVIRONMENTS ARE DIFFERENT FROM NOTIONAL 
DISASTER ENVIRONMENTS 
The United States has never truly had to respond to a large-scale CBRN attack. 
The World Trade Center and Oklahoma City were both horrific, but both were limited 
both in target selection and in size, and neither attack used CBRN.  Furthermore, of the 
various types of special disaster situations, the high explosives are arguably the easiest to 
manage because there are usually little to no residual effects from their use.  The fact that 
there is (sometimes) no single impact (like a large bomb) event to alert the population 
that a hazard exists, coupled with the invisibility of the harmful agent, has an immense 
effect on the public’s reaction to the (CBRN) terrorists event.57  Therefore, with this 
added dimension of complexity for responders,  CBRN events remain the most 
challenging situations with residual concerns that senior leadership has the least 
experience in managing.   
Furthermore, the Post-Katrina Act defines a catastrophic incident as any natural 
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in extraordinary levels 
of casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, 
environment, economy, national morale, or government function in an area.58  By that 
definition, an attack using CBRN at any level beyond just the simple use of white powder 
in envelops would conceivably qualify.  Surely by the insertion of the criteria of national 
morale, the bar has been set at a level where even smaller events could be defined as 
catastrophic due to the impact on the national psyche.  Just by the mere introduction of 
the elements of CBRN, the traditional pathways to disaster response and recovery are 
altered.  Responses to WMD (CBRN) terrorists’ attacks differ from response to natural 
                                                 
57 Steven Crimando, “The Bio-psycho-social Consequences of Terrorism,” Supplement to New Jersey 
Medicine, September 2004, vol. 101, no. 9, 86. 
58 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management: Observations on DHS’s 
Preparedness for Catastrophic Disasters, Publication No. GAO-08-868T (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Accountability Office, 2008), 2. 
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disasters. First responders (and follow-on forces) need to deal with the effects of the 
WMD (CBRN), which may be different that the effects from a natural disaster.59 
This chapter will examine and highlight some of the key ways that responding to 
a CBRN event would be different than responding in a normal disaster environment.  The 
experience level of responders, the concerns with site-remediation and harmful CBRN 
environments, and the expectation that outside media influences may cause the FCO 
additional confusion will be touched on briefly as it is important for the FCO to recognize 
these factors in a CBRN response.  However, the legal implications, media and societal 
concerns along with the tactical and operational aspects of a CBRN environment will be 
discussed in greater detail as these are the primary areas of concern that provide the 
greatest disparity from the way FCOs conduct traditional response and recovery 
operations on a daily basis and the complex world of CBRN response and recovery. 
1. Experience Level of Responders, Leadership, and Staff 
Since the United States has not experienced a major attack on its soil with 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons—but it has had two attacks by the 
use of explosives, the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing and the attacks of 
September 11, 2001—the knowledge base as to what is required to respond in such 
events is somewhat limited and restricted to a few jurisdictions within the country.  Not 
to mention the fact that since over seven years has passed since the last major attack, 
much has changed in the ways of emergency response, and many of the key responders in 
those events have long since retired or otherwise moved on. For example, the state of 
New Mexico’s Office of Emergency Management had a historically high vacancy rate of 
35 percent in 2006.60 Other states are in the same position. 
In essence, since the turnover rate for emergency management officials at the 
state and local levels is high, it will be even more imperative that the federal partnership 
                                                 
59 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Catastrophic Disaster Response Officer’s Handbook: 
Techniques and Procedures, Publication No. (2006) http://call.army.mil/docs/06-08/06-08.pdf (accessed 
November 14, 2008). 
60 State of New Mexico Legislative Finance Committee, Homeland Security Act, Fiscal Impact Report 
(2006), 3. 
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component of the emergency management team be solid and cohesive when dealing with 
an event as devastating as a CBRN attack to ensure continuity and unity of effort across 
the board. 
2. Site Remediation 
CBRN events will have residual consequences that must be addressed; especially 
considering the residuals could be harmful to workers and residents for years to come.  
Past cases of accidents involving nuclear weapons and the spread of contamination have 
revealed such incidents to be very difficult challenges for leaders.   
The nuclear weapons accident that occurred in 1966 in Palomares, Spain, 
provides some good indications of the issues to be faced when dealing with widespread 
contamination. The Palomares accident occurred on January 17, 1966, when a United Air 
Force B-52 bomber collided with a USAF KC-135 aircraft.  The mid-air collision caused 
two of the four thermonuclear weapons onboard to release radioactive materials.  This 
resulted in a three-month response to identify, characterize, remove, and remediate dust 
and debris contaminated with plutonium.61   In those three months following the event, 
1,700 U.S. personnel and Spanish Civil Guards worked to decontaminate the area. An 
estimated 1,400 tons of radioactive soil and vegetation was excavated and sent to the 
United States for disposal (at the Savannah River Plant in Georgia) and crops of tomatoes 
were buried or burned at a location near the site. Through all this, U.S. personnel wore 
protective clothing and underwent regular radiation checks; such measures were not 
taken for the Spanish workers. The Air Force commander in charge later stated, "The 
United States Air Force was unprepared to provide adequate detection and monitoring for 
its personnel when an aircraft accident occurred involving plutonium weapons in a 
remote area of a foreign country."62  
                                                 
61 United States Air Force Medical Services, “Air Force Releases reports on Palomares, Spain and 
Thule Airbase, Greenland Nuclear Weapons Accidents,” 
http://airforcemedicine.afms.mil/latestnews/palomares.htm (accessed October 4, 2008). 
62 Steven Schwartz, Broken Arrows: The Palomares and Thule Accidents, Atomic Audit: The Costs 
and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 
1998) http://www.brookings.edu/projects/archive/nucweapons/box7_3.aspx (accessed December 6, 2008), 
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The above event was accidental, occurred in 1966, and was located in a mainly 
rural area.  Similar plutonium contamination and the clean-up practices would be 
required if the event were a true targeted terrorists attack in an urban setting in 2008, but 
there would be a much greater degree of complexity. 
The state and local governments would have the primary responsibility for 
planning the recovery of the affected areas.63  This would be the case should a nuclear 
weapon accident response be required or other chemical, biological, or even radiological 
event were to occur.  It would require the establishment of some form of a Site 
Remediation Working Group (SRWG).  For nuclear and radiological events, the SRWG 
is an organization formed with the sole purpose of focusing on site remediation issues 
and draws its expertise from various elements (federal, state, and local) that respond to 
the event.  Membership in the SRWG will vary depending on the extent (and type) of 
contamination.64  Another such specialized team is the Federal Radiological Monitoring 
and Assessment Center (FRMAC) which is established at or near the scene of an incident 
to coordinate radiological assessment and monitoring.65 Both of these capabilities would 
normally be employed should an attack using radiation or nuclear material occurs.  
These capabilities will be under the guidance and direction of the FCO and Joint 
Field Office’s Unified Coordination Group.  If the origin of the attack was chemical or 
biological similar specialized groups would also be formed. At present the FCO cadre  
does not have experience in either organizing or working with such groups, and there 
would be a learning curve on the part of the assigned FCO to gain his or her knowledge 
bearings on such topics. 
3. Harmful Environments Caused by CBRN Attack 
An important role of the FCO is to ensure the safety and welfare of the members 
of the Joint Field Office.  This is normally “job-1” listed on the incident action plan 
                                                 
63 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response (NARP) Procedures Manual, 
Publication No. DoDD 3150.8-M (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense 2005), 115. 
64Ibid., 116. 
65 DHS, “Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex,” NUC-2-2. 
 27
(IAP).66  In hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods, the steps or tasks to perform 
to accomplish this objective and yet still have a rapid battle rhythm toward dealing with 
the event are a matter of routine because this particular objective is accomplished so 
often.  In a CBRN environment, just how to remain safe and yet achieve the mission will 
likely be an unknown which may cause undue delay in getting things accomplished. 
This is even compounded more in biological/pandemic type events where the 
responders can become vectors themselves and can, in fact, infect and kill each other or 
the population they are serving.  In a response process that is predicated on the face to 
face relationship and partnership with a facility like a Joint Field Office (JFO), this is a 
legitimate concern for FCOs.  It is counter-intuitive to have a JFO that is not 
collaboratively staffed both in space and people at a location in a building, but the nature 
of CBRN environment may dictate exactly such an approach, if by bringing employees 
together in a single location some could be infected. 
4. Outside Media Influences Causing Confusion 
Throughout America, there are countless organizations with clear political 
agendas. Many of these have invested a great deal of money and effort into advancing 
their causes.67  They tend to hire retired scientists, contractors, and other such learned and 
non-learned people to come on the airways to critique every move and decision made by 
senior leaders such as the FCO and the Unified Coordination Group.  With the 
competitive and voracious appetite of the 24 hour media outlets, the management of 
expectations and credibility of actions taken will be questioned. This will occur not only 
from the established media, but also from private, innovative sources. For instance during 
hurricane Katrina, national attention was gained by the “Slidell blogger.” Later dubbed 
the accidental journalists, he provided an alternate source of information that was 
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unchecked and uncontrolled.68  If a CBRN event were to occur the FCO should expect 
and plan for this type of activity to occur and develop plans to deal with this wave of 
traditional and non-traditional media interest. Failure to properly mange these types of 
media influences on public opinion could cause the public to lose confidence in the 
actions the government is taking to deal with the consequences of a CBRN event.   
5. Legal Implications of CBRN Events 
The federal government is assuming a more proactive role in the preparation, 
response, and recovery from attacks on the United States.  In congressional research 
findings, it was determined that state and local emergency response personnel are not 
adequately prepared or trained for incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or 
chemical materials.69 In response to the assumed validity of this finding, the federal 
government has made a deliberate shift from the traditional process of being reactive and 
waiting for the states to exhaust all resources before engaging at the federal level.  
The objective of the United States government is to ensure all levels of 
government across the nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively 
together, using a national approach to incident management.70   By assuming this 
proactive posture and stressing that the federal government’s ultimately responsibility, it 
can be argued (and is argued in this thesis) that the primary onus, and some would 
suggest the legal responsibly, has transferred from the state and local jurisdictions to the 
federal government.  
Another indication of this subtle responsibility shift is imbedded in one of the four 
conditions for the federal government to utilize resources to recover from a terrorists 
attack.71  Condition four states that the Secretary of Homeland Security may be directed 
to assume responsibly for managing the domestic incident by the President of the United 
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States).72  The Federal Emergency Management Agency Strategic Plan calls for the 
agency to be the nation’s preeminent emergency management and preparedness agency.73   
FEMA is now in a leadership role and must set the standard for emergency management 
across the nation and help build strong relationships among its partners.74  Inherent in this 
policy approach is for FEMA to take a more prominent role in the federal government 
and to more closely engage the state and locals governments. Whenever FEMA is called 
to assume a leadership role, the FCOs become the main instrument to perform that 
leadership task in the field and certainly in a CBRN related declared disaster. 
One of its main tenants of the new National Response Framework (NRF):  
One of the challenges to effective response is the relatively high turnover 
and short tenure among elected and appointed officials responsible for 
response at all levels.  Effective response hinges upon well-trained leaders 
and responders who have invested in response preparedness, developed 
engaged partnerships, and are able to achieve shared objectives.75 
In dealing with common hurricane response, this is hampering readiness. There is 
a high turnover rate in the state and county emergency management agencies (EMA) 
resulting in new personnel unfamiliar with items such as Hurricane Evacuation System 
products.76  If state, county and local emergency management agencies are unfamiliar 
with issues involving hurricane responses that they know they plan for and practice every 
year prior to the annual June first start of the official hurricane season, then how much 
less prepared will these same personnel be when dealing with CBRN issues that are not 
annual in nature and are sometimes off their list of priorities?  
The overall lack of trained staff in some states coupled with the aforementioned 
high turnover rates in some states may leave certain jurisdictions less prepared and 
perhaps more willing to shift or forgo legal matters in deference to the federal 
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government, who is normally perceived as better prepared and trained for CBRN events.  
Another point of emphasis pursuant to the federal government having more statutory 
authorities over state and local jurisdictions is found in the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006.  In Title I Section 101 (National Preparedness) the 
FEMA Administrator is directed to ensure state, regional and local emergency 
preparedness by establishing minimum performance requirements for public and 
community preparedness.77  This clearly establishes the Federal government’s oversight 
role in preparedness to include CBRN, and since funding  state and local equipment, 
training, and other emergency management endeavors is also attached to the this 
relationship, it is becoming more solidified and institutionalized. 
As the federal role becomes more prominent, this places the expectations even 
more prevalently on the senior federal managers to be proficient in all types of disaster 
possibilities, which includes the more complex CBRN event where the state and local 
stakeholders have even less experience in managing than managing the consequences of  
a traditional disaster event.  The unique responsibilities and legal uncertainty across the 
board are exponentially increased in a CBRN environment.  The response and recovery 
landscape is untested because the nation has yet to experience a major CBRN attack that 
requires the full complement of organizational assets and legal intricacies to respond.   
The following statement concerning the federal involvement was more prevalent 
post-hurricane Katrina than today, “[The] degrees of involvement in the initial response 
phases through the recovery phase [in a CBRN event] will vary depending on the type of 
crisis and the ability of the local and State authorities to manage it.”78   The new, more 
proactive approach calls for the federal government, and in particular the new FEMA, to 
be on the ground and engaged immediately and sometimes even before a formal request 
from a governor is made. 
The issue of who is in charge and when they are in charge is commonly a major 
concern.  First responders at the state and local level would manage the initial 
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consequences of a CBRN event, and each state is primarily responsible for law 
enforcement activities during an emergency or disaster.79  However, the federal 
government has primary law enforcement responsibility for preventing and responding to 
terrorists acts, with State and local governments providing assistance as necessary.80 
At times, the sequence of responsibilities in a CBRN event can lead to great 
confusion for the FCOs.  At times, the federal law enforcement and the state and local 
law enforcement communities may have differences of opinion.  Since, legally and 
technically FEMA is not in charge of the event at any time in the continuum, it stands to 
reason that FEMA would be supporting either the federal, state, or locals officials in 
charge; the question of whose course of action to pursue could arise.  At that juncture, the 
FCO would have to know legally to whom the support should be given. 
This type of an intriguing scenario rarely occurs during the course of a natural 
disaster, yet during a CBRN event the legal jockeying could be the rule rather than the 
exception.  In essence, the roles have become more prominent, yet there has not been a 
corresponding training and education process to ensure the key participants, of whom the 
FCO is a member, are abreast of the new normal. By distributing documents such as the 
NRF, the Post-Katrina Emergency Act, and the FEMA Strategic Plan, the notion of the 
federal government’s prominent role in disaster response to include CBRN is perpetrated. 
A case can be made that the documents form a degree of legal sufficiency to the point 
that the federal government becomes legally bound.  This will be an important factor for 
the FCO to understand especially considering the FCO’s do not receive legal training at 
the moment.  
B. MEDIA AND SOCIETY 
Within minutes of an accident (or CBRN incident), the news media might be at 
the scene.  The news media and local citizens shall seek information about how the event 
affects them.  A proactive, comprehensive public affairs program is required to speed the 
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flow of information to the news media, the public, and internal audiences.81   The 
research in this thesis will ascertain the perspectives of the Federal Coordinating Officers 
as they pertain to the media, and determine if a gap exists in the perceived importance of 
dealing with the media in a CBRN environment and the perceived capability of the FCOs 
to manage the media in such an environment.   
The importance of the relationship between the news media and society is 
examined next by looking at the media’s relationship with the United States government 
and the growth of the public’s reliance on the twenty-four hour news services. 
1. Media Relations with the Federal Government 
In catastrophic environments and events, the public often turns to the media for an 
understanding as to what is happening.  The media has had a hit and miss relationship 
with government officials going back to the time of the founding fathers.  The media 
have the constitutional right to acquire news from any source by any lawful means.82  
The information is processed and delivered to the American public and the world in a 
matter of seconds- and sometimes without regard to the information’s authenticity. 
If a CBRN event were to happen on U.S. soil, the FCO, as the President’s 
appointed representative, would be called upon properly manage critical disaster 
information and the media. In a crisis, people would be starving for information. If the 
FCO does not feed them (through the various media outlets), someone else will feed 
them, and it might be dog food (bad information).83  This fact has to be recognized by the 
FCOs at all levels of competency. 
In addition, in such environments the trust factor will be something that will have 
to be recognized.  In several surveys, the public was asked who they would trust most as 
a reliable source of information if a bioterrorism event occurred in their community.  
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Respondents trusted local health department, local physician, or hospital the most.84  
Since the results of such surveys in the past have been consistent and trending even more 
so to trust in the local officials being greater than federal officials, it would seem prudent 
for the FCOs to embrace the situation and capitalize on it by doing deliberate actions and 
outreach with the local level responder apparatus. 
The new FCO Professional Development Program85 is a step in the right direction 
as it requires FCOs to integrate and work with state and local officials on a periodic basis 
prior to any potential incident. Yet it falls short due to overlapping responsibilities of the 
FCOs and the speed of implementation.  At present, selected FCOs have been informally 
assigned to emphasis duties in CBRN specialties, but being able to attend training to 
develop competencies is predicated on the operational tempo and disaster declarations.   
The hurricane season of 2008 was an especially busy one and many of the 
projected competency building outreach, training, and exercises in CBRN was not 
accomplished.  The FCOs that would have been dedicated to gaining CBRN 
competencies were by necessity tasked with hurricane response duties.  Since the pool of 
potential FCOs is limited, the CBRN development activities had to take back seat. To 
develop skills in media relations that will be the cornerstone of societal perceptions 
during a CBRN event, FCOs will need to concentrate on perfecting this craft without 
having to be directed to other duties such as floods and hurricanes.   
2. The 24-Hour News Cycle 
Being forced to deal with the abundance of media requests is just a fact of twenty-
first century government service, and of which the FCO is a primary player.  As the 
President of the United States’ directly appointed representative in a CBRN event, the  
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media will want to hear from that FCO early and often. How well or how poorly the FCO 
conducts himself or herself will, to a large degree, shape the societal viewpoint of the 
success or failure of the federal response.   
When it is all said and done, one can  conceivably predict the types of disasters 
the various levels of community will face [to include CBRN], and one can predict the 
questions the public will have during the disaster (life saving, life sustaining, personal 
protection, etc.) 86  The challenge is to now take up the mantel and develop a process to 
ensure the collective national response stakeholder family exercise together as a federal, 
state, local, tribal, private sector, and news media team system to develop answers to 
these questions beforehand in the jurisdiction affected in the various languages that will 
be required. It is important to remember that not only will the victims of the terrorists act 
be affected but society at large.   
The majority of victims and witnesses to traumatic events (CBRN would be one) 
experience distress reactions. These reactions include a range of physical, emotional, 
cognitive, and behavioral changes such as fear, anxiety, insomnia, and disturbance in 
eating, distractibility, and increases in the use of alcohol, tobacco, and other substances.87  
This could happen to citizens who were not personally affected but were witnesses to the 
event via the television or on the internet.  Taking this factor into account the possible 
number of people who could be affected by an event nationwide is very large.  The real 
risk is how the American public will react to that act of terror on U.S. soil.88  The 
reaction of the responders will go along way to reassuring the public that they are safe. 
Beyond actions taken by the FCOs at the Joint Field Offices, most local, city, and 
state health organizations have websites to address health-related concerns and rumors, 89 
FEMA and the FCOs partnering with these entities and performing outreach to the 
communities would provide both valuable information and name/face recognition that 
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would be valuable to reduce public anxiety.  This protocol is best developed prior to an 
event occurring as it is often difficult to build credibility during a large event such as a 
major CBRN attack. 
C. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL 
The natural instinct of an FCO would be to actively engage the incident at the 
closest proximity possible.  The current trend of FEMA and other federal agencies to lean 
forward and deploy resources would be normally pursued.  Since the aftermath of 
hurricane Katrina, the leaning forward posture of the federal government has been the 
new rule rather than the exception. But like no other event, in a CBRN event, acting too 
swiftly and getting too close could cause harm to the responders from initial and follow-
on effects, and if the leader does not understand this difference and factor-in those 
differences into the objective setting equation, the response forces under his charge could 
be at great risk. 
The United States military provides a good model for addressing certain key high 
value, high consequence events.  The military has a primary purpose to fight and win 
wars, just as FEMA has a mandate to coordinate the federal response and provide support 
to the states pursuant to a disaster or emergency declared by the President.  Yet, the 
military goes further in preparing for CBRN (or as more commonly used in the military, 
NBC, for nuclear, biological and chemical).  All branches of the military have additional 
and specific doctrine to address CBRN environments because those environments have 
been determined to be unique and require a different set of engagement practices. For 
example, the United States Marine Corps published a directive that deals specifically 
with NBC: the manual MCO 3500.7.  The manual assesses training that prepares Marines 
to perform in combat. This manual is a fundamental tool for supervisors and commanders 
to build and maintain unit NBCD combat readiness.90 
FEMA, on the other hand, has not followed the same pathway. Responding to a 
CBRN event would require the FCO to make both tactical and operational decisions at 
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times based on the contaminated environment vice purely operational necessity. In the 
military, enemy attacks utilizing NBC weapons and agents generally are expected to 
cause some amount of residual and persistent contamination. In order to properly protect 
the force and make sound tactical decisions, the commander must know where 
contamination is located, its concentration, and the estimated duration of 
contamination.91  The FCO will need this same level of vital information only there are 
no organic FEMA forces that can provide such information.  The FCO will have to 
mission assign (MA) other agencies such as the Department of Energy (DOE), 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or even the Department of Defense (DoD).  At 
present, the FCOs do not conduct regular training with the above agencies and have not 
be trained, even in a general sense, in the tools of CBRN contamination prediction. 
Terror is fear, and the goal of terrorism is the creation of fear so intense that it 
disrupts the psychological, social, and economic functioning of individuals, communities, 
and nations.92  Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and other such traditional disasters are in 
and of themselves rooted in fear.  Fear may become a byproduct, but not the design.   
This chapter discussed the nuances of a CBRN event as compared to a traditional 
disaster event.  The experience level of responders to address CBRN was discussed along 
with various site remediation groups/teams, harmful environments, the media, society, 
legal implications, and tactical operations.   
What is clear is that CBRN disasters are unique and the FCOs will require a more 
specialized degree of preparation to be effective in dealing with the consequences of such 
an attack.  Some tangible actions to pursue will be discussed in the recommendations 
chapter of this thesis. 
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY  
A. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY IN CBRN ENVIRONMENTS 
Any organization has to have the proper structure to match its mission and goals 
in order to be truly effective.  In addition, the leaders must embrace that structure and 
have an understanding as to how to ensure quality performance within the structure.  For 
the Federal Coordinating Officer in a CBRN environment, the complexity of the 
challenges to be faced will make having the proper structure even more important.  This 
chapter will examine the obstacles inherent in a centralized organizational structure by 
providing both an historical and contextual review of the problems faced by a very 
centrally managed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during hurricane 
Katrina.  Next, the concept of decentralization will be engaged from the FCO and FEMA 
perspective as the agency moves to an even greater consolidation and hierarchical 
management structure.  To conclude this chapter, decentralization in the context of the 
Joint Field Office (JFO), Unified Coordination Group and the Federal Coordinating 
Officer will be addressed to include the bottleneck effect, external relationships, and 
creative energies as applied to managing in a CBRN environment. 
1. Organizational Structure History 
Historically, the constitution of the United States purposely keeps the federal 
government weak, while delegating significant powers to the states.93 This decentralized 
approach to governance has proven very successful over the nation’s 230 plus-year 
history.  Nevertheless, governmental organizations and agencies have found it very 
difficult to duplicate the same principles of governance within their structures.  Over the 
years, the federal government became (and continues to become) larger and more 
centralized, and the events of September 11, 2001 greatly accelerated the process.94  It is 
a natural (organizational or agency) reaction, when attacked, to hunker down and adopt a 
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command-and-control mentality.95  This centralization bias can reduce the ability of the 
tactical leaders such as the FCOs to make critical decisions on the ground which is often 
the essential aspect of success during fluid situations. 
For example, during the response to hurricane Katrina in 2005, the organizational 
and operational model employed by FEMA was one of a consolidated construct.  Viewed 
from that perspective, what subsequently happened in New Orleans was not necessarily 
any one individual’s fault.  Of course, as in any event, some individuals could have made 
better decisions, but the real culprit was the system itself.96 
The then FEMA director, Michael Brown, had instituted a policy that only a few 
key people could essentially speak to the media on behalf of the agency.  In the world of 
emergency response, being able to speak for the agency or organization is equivalent to 
empowerment. This type of configuration with the director at the apex, being active in the 
tactical movement of resources, is the antithesis of what is advocated by those who favor 
a more decentralized operational structure to be effective in a fast-paced, dynamic CBRN 
environment 
2. Examining Decentralization in the Context of the FCOs 
Decentralized organizations can be so resilient that it is hard to affect their 
internal structure.97  If the internal structure of the organization is intact then it can 
function. It is possible that lines of authority and responsibility are best when 
decentralized and empowerment is delegated throughout the entire organization and the 
unified command structure.  As actions need to be taken they can be immediately  
approved and completed at the level nearest to the situation.  No one knows more clearly 
as to what the concerns are than the people observing the situation first hand.  Great ideas 
come from people closest to the ideas.98 
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In the example being discussed, like a modern day Montezuma,99 once Mr. 
Brown was rendered ineffective because he lost trust with the Department of Homeland 
Security leadership, the Congress, the President, and most importantly the American 
public, the entire Federal Emergency Management Agency was rendered impotent.  
FEMA’s attempt to rebuild trust continues to this day and has evolved into the new 
FEMA. The term “new FEMA” was used by the FEMA Administrator to convey the 
changing culture at FEMA by getting people to think more broadly in terms of results and 
the implementation of new practices and processes.100  Incumbent in this new paradigm 
has been the quasi-militarization of FEMA.  Much of today’s American corporate 
thinking and strategies are heavily rooted in military strategy.101  It seems as though 
companies and organizations have seen the military perform well on the battlefields and 
assume the same processes can be transferred to various parts of American society, both 
in the public and private sector. As a good soldier should, FEMA has followed suit. 
Looking at FEMA Operations Centers today is much like looking at a military 
operations center.  The transformation even includes terminology to the point of retired 
military officers still being called by their former military ranks, the term operational 
tempo being substituted with battle rhythm, and federal, state and local assets now being 
called “blue forces” as everyday parlance.   
It has been as if the storied history of the agency did not exist.  It is as if the 
successes demonstrated at the massive 2004 Florida hurricanes, the many numbers of 
floods, earthquakes, and tornados responded to over the past 29 years never occurred. In 
the minds of the Congress, the other federal agencies, the media, and, more importantly, 
the American public, FEMA, and its staff were simply incompetent. 
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What if a more decentralized organizational model had existed in FEMA during 
hurricane Katrina?  Immediately as Director Brown was removed from the leadership 
position, another official or several officials would have risen and taken the mantel.  
Confidence in the agency would have been maintained as actions to save lives would 
have continued at the level nearest to the situation as required.  The subsequent wholesale 
changes in the agency perhaps would not have been demanded. Sometimes it is not what 
happens outside of the company (agency) that matters but what happens internally to 
make it succeed or fail.102 
In most armies or fighting forces, as the general goes so goes the organization.  
This puts an inordinate amount of pressure and responsibility on one person to be the 
lynch-pin and final arbitrator of the ultimate organizational success or failure.  That has 
become the norm in America today both in the marketplace (and in government), to beef-
up the image of the executive as being all-powerful.103 Centralization, by its nature, 
implies a commonality, a central point; yet in today’s fluid emergency response 
environment and especially in a CBRN event; this same centrality may well be the 
weakest link within the entire organizational and operational structure as speed and 
flexibility become precious, salient commodities in such milieus. 
3. Decentralization May Be the Missing Element 
The key to preparing the FCO’s for operations in the chaotic world of CBRN 
response could well be the degree in which they are taught to apply and implement the 
tenants of a decentralized organization.  An organization that does not rely on the leader 
for every move it makes is an organization that does not sink or swim merely on the 
fortunes of that one person.  This is a unique concept in America and in government, and 
an even more counterintuitive notion for a Federal Coordinating Officer who is hired on 
his/her ability to take command and control of large groups of sometimes unfamiliar 
people, mold them into an effective staff, and then deploy to a chaotic scene where 
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lifesaving decisions are made as a matter of routine.  These types of lifesaving decisions 
will be even more problematic when a CBRN impetuous is involved. 
Operational tempo, logistics operations, the health service support system (HHS), 
personnel support system (PSS), and reconstitution efforts as in the military model may 
be profoundly affected by the introduction of CBRN materials.104  Yet in the military 
system, commanders spend many training hours developing their competencies to lead in 
such environments.  It would be difficult at best for an FCO to be effective as the focal 
point for decision making when the requisite training, unlike the military, has not been 
provided.  It can be also argued that training alone is not the answer because unlike the 
command responsibilities of a military officer, the FCO’s primary task is coordination, 
and coordination is more difficult to achieve when those being coordinated are not 
compelled to follow. 
4. The Current State of the Organizational Structure 
At present the FCO and the established Joint Field Office (JFO) is the 
quintessential example of a centralized organization. The JFO is the primary federal 
incident management field structure; it is a central location for the coordination of 
organizations with the responsibility for response and recovery.105 Not much happens 
unless the FCO (and the Joint Coordination Group on larger events) is aware and  
authorizes every thing that happens at the JFO is the sole responsibility of the FCO (or 
Joint Coordination Group).  Staffs, even more experienced ones, tend to hesitate to speak 
up or act for fear of failure and reprisal. 
In preparing Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) for CBRN environments it is 
suggested that a deliberate shift in leadership style has to occur which would be a great 
departure from the current system of centralized command and control to a more 
decentralized system leveraging the talents, skills, and competencies of all members of 
the organization and encouraging innovation, risk-taking, and critical decision 
                                                 
104 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2008), xi. 
105 DHS, National Response Framework, 61. 
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management at all levels.  Operations in a CBRN environment make sustainment 
planning (and operations) more complex.106  FEMA, by design, focuses on sustainment, 
resilience, and reconstitution in conjunction with other stakeholders.  The key baseline 
priorities include:  
• activating people, resources, and capacities 
• requesting additional resources and capabilities 
• identifying needs and pre-positioning resources107 
Having a centralized, hierarchal protocol to accomplish the baseline priorities in 
the complexity and uncertainty of a CBRN environment, as discussed in Chapter III, will 
slow down the response to requests even more unless another approach is adopted. 
The “wait to act until we talk to the boss” modality should be reconsidered, and 
the innovative gene has to be allowed to spread throughout the organization. Enlighten 
leaders do not have to have the vision (answers) themselves; they need only possess the 
willingness and ability to draw the vision (answers) from their people and inspire and 
empower those people to do what it takes to bring the vision (answers) into action.108  
Indeed enlighten leaders nurture and encourage their people to be open, creative, and 
innovative and find what it takes to achieve the shared objectives; and this brings out the 
best in people109.   
Without this paradigm shift, the current stovepipe will become too limiting as all 
decisions are funneled through a single chokepoint, creating both a bottleneck and also 
reducing the quality of decisions made simply by the overload of information coming 
into one single source for absorption, processing and adjudication.  It is not that open 
systems necessarily make better decisions.  It is, however, just that open systems are able 
to respond more quickly because each member has access to knowledge and the ability to 
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108 Ed Oakley and Doug Krug, Enlightened Leadership: Getting to the Heart of Change (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1991), 19. 
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make direct use of that knowledge.110  When lives are at stake a quicker velocity of the 
decisions timetable is required to increase the probability of success. 
The figure below graphically illustrates this concept: 
 Traditional Model   Decentralized Model     
Figure 1.   Comparison of Decision Making Models Traditional versus Decentralized 
The outputs include both primary and support decisions on key CBRN concerns.  
Such concerns include things as decontamination, non contaminated evacuation, CBRN 
agent matrix, site remediation, safe disaster housing, workforce protection, plume 
projection, and many more requirements that are unique from normal disaster operational 
needs.  Notice how in the traditional stovepipe command and control model depicted in 
Figure 1, decisions are funneled through one source, the FCO, and actions are not taken 
until approval is granted.  This result in fewer decisions being made, some decisions 
falling by the wayside, and requiring more time for decision consideration as each input 
has to compete for time on the decision-makers docket.  In today’s flatter organizations, 
work of significance demands effective collaboration within and across functional, 
                                                 











physical, and hierarchical boundaries.111  Having a single decision maker required to 
make a multitude of decisions before the organization can move forward is not effective. 
This myopic approach would be exponentially less effective in a chaotic CBRN 
environment.  The environment is too fluid, robust, and multi-dimensional to have a 
bottleneck decision making entity like the current FCO one-stop shop structure to be 
successful. 
Contrast this with the decentralized model where decisions are made in a free 
flowing, non-competitive basis, where there is not a bottleneck, and where the number of 
inputs creates more decisions (outputs) due to the sheer power of multiplication.  One 
input can create more than a single output in very little time.  In decentralized 
organizations, anyone can do anything.112 Members do not have to report each action to 
any single head and they are responsible for that decision only to themselves.113   In 
essence, as with the arms of a starfish, the players in decentralized organizations when 
applied correctly, have relative freedom and can go in a multitude of directions.114 
If people are responsible for the decision they make and they cannot pass the 
blame upwards to another person who is hierarchically senior to that person, at least on 
the standard organizational chart, then the decision maker at whatever level will 
concentrate of the task at hand and make decisions that will enhance his personal career 
and at the same time, and produce a more favorable outcome for the situation at hand.  It 
is inconceivable that given true responsibility for decisions that people would not 
endeavor to make good choices.   
An unintended byproduct of such an open system is that only true decision 
makers will apply to be a part of the system.  In today’s centralized systems, employees 
can reside on an organizational chart under a supervisor who is authoritarian, and that 
employee may never make a quality, relevant decision in the course of a career. Nor is 
                                                 
111 Rob Cross and Andrew Parker, The Hidden Power of Social Networks: Understanding How Work 
Really Gets Done in Organizations (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006), 13.  
112 Brafman and Beckstrom, Starfish and the Spider, 48. 
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the employee encouraged to do so.  An ineffective system requires ineffective pieces in 
order to lumber its way through every day existence.  People who enjoy such a 
monotonous environment will not seek to join an open, decentralized system where they 
would be forced to make quality decisions by virtue of being a member.  Thus only 
quality people will choose to be associated with quality organizations, and as the 
organization prospers, the ones that cannot keep pace will simply depart, and, in typical 
starfish fashion, another arm (person) will come to take its place and prosper.  All of this 
metamorphous is done with little to no effect on the total capabilities of the organization. 
The models demonstrate how theoretically much more can be accomplished with 
a decentralized model and how decisions can build on each other without having to rely 
on a single input to stimulate the output.  Essentially the one to one correlation is 
eliminated and productivity is exponentially increased. As productivity increases so does 
the probability of a more representative decision making process, and with more 
representation will come a greater degree of relevance- making the correct decision in a 
timely manner and with a high degree of accuracy. 
5. External Relationships Thrive with Greater Decentralization 
What the implementation of a decentralized system offers is the opportunity for 
the Federal Coordinating Officer to devote more time to external relationships than to 
being bogged down with decisions that can and should be made by the team members. 
Despite the wishes of most leaders and managers, there are still only 24 hours in each 
given day and in those 24 hours regardless of how efficient a leader may be, they can 
only entertain a certain number of decisions.  If time and energies are devoted to internal 
decisions and relationships then that same time must be subtracted from the external 
decisions and relationships. It is a basic mathematical equation:  
 
FCO Creative Energies = External relationships/decisions + Internal 
relationships/decisions 
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The left side of the equation is finite for the leader/manager; one person can 
physically accomplish just so much without harnessing allies—be it from internal or 
external sources.  Where success can be made is by manipulating the right side of the 
standard equation.  External relationships are critical to the health of the network 
(organization).  One can miss these relationships if one focuses only on internal 
collaboration.115 
In essence, what effectively instituting an open, decentralized organization allows 
is for less time to be devoted to orchestrating internal decisions and more time to focus on 
the development of the external capabilities.  It is generally accepted that operations in a 
CBRN environment will be slowed as personnel are encumbered by things such as 
protective equipment and exposure to CBRN effects. Hazards may require abandonment 
or limited use of contaminated areas and avoidance of planned routes and terrain.116  Yet, 
the traditional role of FEMA will remain constant—providing federal assistance to state, 
local, tribal, and certain private non-profit groups. Decentralization, by form and 
function, when applied properly can allow the FCO more time to discuss strategies with 
other federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector decisions makers while at the same 
time having the knowledge that the internal workings of the organization will continue to 
prosper because the system’s design, by its very nature, has the propensity to prosper. 
This chapter discussed organizational complexity in CBRN environments and 
made a strong case for the notion that in disaster response operations the greater the 
complexity of the event, the greater is the need for organizational decentralization. The 
origins of organizational history were briefly reviewed, and then the concept of 
decentralization in regards to both FEMA and the FCO’s was examined using hurricane 
Katrina as the sentinel model.  What is evident is when faced with a large, complex 
disaster situation, FEMA did not account itself well.  The complexity of a large CBRN 
event would provide even greater challenges than hurricane Katrina.  Upcoming in 
Chapter VI, the idea of a more decentralized FEMA organizational structure will be 
introduced and a strong recommendation made for immediate implementation. 
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In the fulfillment of one of the main objectives of this research, a survey was 
conducted of the current Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) as of July 2008.  The 
motive was to bridge the theories put forth in this thesis with actual first-hand perceptions 
from the core group of individuals upon which the theories are predicated. The survey 
was provided via email or in hard copy to the FCOs and a request to quickly return the 
surveys was attached.  Furthermore, the FCO's surveys were separated based on 
experience level as measured by time in the position.  FCOs assigned for less than one 
year, for the purposes of this research, were considered to be “newer,” though in the FCO 
position, time spent assigned is not always indicative of experience level based on the 
number of disasters to which they have been assigned. FCOs assigned for more than one 
year were considered to be “seasoned,” again not measuring the number or complexity of 
previous assignments. 
A total of 31 FCOs were surveyed; 18 were seasoned and thirteen were newer.  
This sample represents 79.5 of the total FCOs assigned to FEMA as of July 2008. 
1. Significance of the Sample 
Although on the surface having 31 respondents to a survey may not seem 
impressive, yet the number represented 79.5 percent of the total possible population.  
These are the individuals who will serve in the capacity of FCO should a CBRN event 
occur.  Having captured and recorded their perspectives is even more pertinent when 
discussed along the same lines as men who have served as president of the United States.  
There have been only 43 people who have served in the distinct post of President of the 
United States.  If 79.5 percent of those persons could be somehow surveyed and their 
perspectives recorded, though the quantitative number may not be great, the qualitative 
value of the data received would be valuable. The same basic theory applies here.  
Though the number 31 is small, but because it represents 79.5 percent of the total 
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population of individuals who will serve as the Presidential appointed FCO should a 
CBRN event occur, the research value of the data is greatly increased. 
2. Survey Instrument and Design 
The survey instrument utilized to gather data for the research was developed 
specifically for the FCOs based on skill-sets and competencies development criteria that 
were discussed with the director, FCO Operations Office, 117 in the spring of 2008.  The 
survey included a checklist,118 rating scale,119 and a few selected open-ended questions 
that would allow the respondent to elaborate where required or desired.  The director 
approved both the survey content and the issuance of the instrument to the Federal 
Coordinating Officers representing all ten FEMA regions. 
A more elaborate survey instrument was specifically not chosen as it was 
determined that more FCOs would respond to a more personalized instrument coming 
from a fellow FCO, than a complicated survey instrument coming from various available 
web-based applications.  The instrument proved user friendly to the respondent, but more 
difficult to codify the results manually verses a more sophisticated, automated results 
measurements capability.  In future surveys, a commercially available survey product 
such as Zoomerang120 should be considered.  This will allow for quicker dissections of 
the results and will be much less researcher intensive to extract the results. 
Quality survey research involves acquiring information about one or more groups 
of people—perhaps about their characteristic, opinions, attitudes, or previous  
 
                                                 
117 The current Director of FCO Operations Office is Mr. Ted Monette.  Mr. Monette is a veteran FCO 
and has been tasked with the leadership and mentoring of the FCO Cadre.  Mr. Monette has extensive 
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118 “A checklist is a list of behaviors, characteristics, or other entities that a researcher is 
investigating.” (Definition sourced from Paul Leedy and Jeanne Ornrod, Practical Research: Planning and 
Design, 8th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Merrill, Prentice Hall, 2005), 185.  
119 Rating scales were developed by Rensis Likert in the 1930’s to access people’s attitudes. 
(Definition sourced from Leedy and Ornrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design, 185).  
120 Zoomerang is an on line survey tool available at www.zoomerang.com.  
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experiences—by asking questions and tabulating the following results.121  In that vein, 
this research tool did exactly that by qualifying and quantifying the thoughts, ideas, and 
concerns of the FCOs as related to CBRN. 
3. Survey Implementation 
The implementation of the survey was in a phased approach.  During phase one, 
the survey was provided via hard copy to the newer FCOs as a part of their FCO 
orientation course at FEMA, Headquarters in Washington, D.C.  All FCOs are required to 
attend orientation within the first year of assignment to the FCO cadre.  During April 
2008, a blank survey was handed to each FCO in attendance.  The FCOs were instructed 
to fill out the survey and return them to the proctor.  In the delivery of the survey, the 
FCOs were told that attribution was optional.  They could put their names on the survey 
or answer anonymously.  Only 30.7 percent of the respondents chose to include their 
names, and of the ones that included their names, the rankings for how well they were 
prepared to respond seemed to be higher than those who chose to answer anonymously.   
This led to a notion of identification bias within the survey itself. In research, bias 
is any influence, condition, or set of conditions that singly or together distort the data.122 
Could the results be skewed if the respondent freely chose to include their name?  After a 
careful review of the results, it was determined that even though the general ranking on 
some critical questions were higher, those higher rankings could be justified by the 
professional experience and resumes possessed by those who responded and include their 
names.  Those who included their names had prior military nuclear, biological, and 
chemical (NBC) and hazardous material (HAZMAT) training, which lends itself to a 
more overall knowledge of CBRN as a discipline.  Therefore, it was determined more 
than conceivably that this select population would, in fact, appropriately rank their 
knowledge in certain CBRN technical competencies on the higher side of the scale. 
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Phase II of the survey implementation was to send the survey via email to the 
seasoned FCOs.  These again were the FCOs who have been employed by FEMA within 
the FCO cadre for more than one year.  The survey was sent out to the cadre beginning 
April 27, 2008.  Understandably the rate of return during the phase II effort was far less 
than the 100 percent response experienced during phase I.  This was mainly due to the 
sense of urgency inherent in having all the FCOs in phase I present at one place at one 
time.  Even though the percent responding during phase II was 69.2 percent, the 
distribution of the rankings and responses were representative of that population at large.  
The FCOs that did not respond were assigned to specific disaster duties throughout the 
nation and during such assignments time is of the essence, and to devote time to concerns 
other than Joint Field Office operations detracts from obtaining incident specific 
objectives.   
Rather than petitioning the Director FCO Operations Office to compel the FCOs 
to respond and risk tainted data from unwilling or preoccupied respondents, the research 
decision was made to accept the 79.5 percent threshold as representative of the entire 
population, and to continue with the assessment phase of the survey process.  This 
decision was also supported by the general composition of the FCO cadre.  If a 
population is markedly heterogeneous then a larger sample is normally needed, when the 
population is fairly homogenous then a smaller sample is appropriate.123  The seasoned 
FCOs have very similar FEMA experiences and therefore seemed to have very similar 
responses despite their professional backgrounds prior to joining the agency. 
4. Analysis 
The analysis phase of the survey process involved reviewing the returned 
questionnaires and recording the findings. This included the averages, mean, mode, and 
other statistical methods to codify the data in measurable and quantifiable research results 
in which credible inferences can be drawn and applied toward the alteration and 
development of new policies and procedures related to the FCO Cadre and CBRN  
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readiness.  Both phases of the research were done separately and analyzed separately.  
Some linkage and comparison are established from the analysis in phase II from the 
analysis identified in phase I. 
B. SURVEY RESULTS 
The results of the survey codify, aggregates, and makes academically sound 
determinations based on the input received and reviewed.  The questions asked were 
designed to elicit both open- and closed-ended responses across a wide range of topics 
that were determined to be important to obtain a picture as to what is the condition of the 
FCO cadre in relationship to CBRN.  By design, survey research captures a fleeting 
moment in time, much as a camera takes a single-framed photograph of an on-going 
activity, and by drawing conclusions from one transitory collection of data one may 
extrapolate about the state of affairs over a longer period of time.124  This is important to 
understand as the data captured herein can be used as the foundation for a change in the 
way the FCO cadre has approached CBRN response and recovery since the inception of 
the cadre in 1999.  Based on the results herein, the FCO CBRN Tiered Qualification 
Plan125 can be further revised and changed to reflect the realities contained herein. 
A key incentive to inspire respondents to invest time and energy to both fill-out 
and return the questionnaire was to provide a summary of the results to the responder.126  
In keeping with that key incentive to get respondents to return their surveys, the results of 
the survey was presented to key FEMA leadership and members of the FCO cadre during 
the fall 2008 Semi-Annual FCO Retreat in Lansdowne, Virginia.  The survey was well-
received and some eyes were opened as to the nature of some of the responses. 
This survey represents the first time the members of the FCO cadre have been 
provided the opportunity to formally participate in the development of a potential design 
change in the FCO cadre’s approach to the fluid demands of disaster response and 
                                                 
124 Leedy and Ornrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design, 184. 
125 The FCO WMD/CBRN Tiered Qualification Plan when fully implemented will assign FCOs by 
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126 Leedy and Ornrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design, 194. 
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recovery. Although not every FCO did respond to the survey due to operational 
commitments, they all were afforded the opportunity to respond.  Of note, the most 
recently hired FCOs, of which there were two, since this survey was conducted, are not 
represented herein as the cut-off time for data collecting had expired prior to them being 
hired.  As an aside, both of the new hires come from similar backgrounds of other 
responding newer FCOs, so the omission of the input from the two newer individuals is 
not seen as a significant deterrent to the acquisition of quality inferences. 
In this thesis, the results received from the newer FCOs will be presented first 
followed by the results received from the seasoned FCOs.  The purpose of each question 
will be defined and then analyzed. At the end of the chapter a synthesis of the input from 
the newer and seasoned FCOs will be presented.  This will lead to a final summary of 
findings section within this thesis.  
C. PHASE I (SURVEY OF NEWER FCOS) 
1. Question 1  
Question: How important to the success of an FCO is knowledge in the below areas as it 
relates to a CBRNE Disaster (Table 1)? 
Table 1.   Importance of Knowledge 




      
4.8 
Legal Statues and 
Authorities  





     4.3 
State and Local 
response procedures 





     4.5 
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a. Purpose   
The purpose of this question was to assess the relative importance that the 
FCOs placed on knowledge in specific CBRN competencies.  The competencies where 
selected based on collaboration with the Director FCO Operations Office and were 
selected because of the cross-section representation of total knowledge and the decision 
that having superior knowledge in the five areas described would be a great predictor of 
success for an FCO assigned to respond to a CBRN event.  It is recognized that other 
competency indicators could have been chosen, but as a snapshot of relative skill sets, the 
five depicted serve a valuable purpose. 
b. Analysis 
It was interesting to note that every respondent rated every competency 
within this question either 3, 4, or 5, denoting that the FCOs felt all listed competencies 
were  important to their success in a CBRN environment, and of the competencies listed 
the management of the media was deemed to be the most important. This suggests that 
the FCOs do have an understanding of key competencies within a CBRN environment.  If 
the responses were had been more in the 2 or less range that would have been indicative 
of the FCOs not believing the listed competencies were important to them and their 
responsibilities during CBRN events. 
2. Question 2 
Question: On a scale of 1-5, with 5 being very competent, rate your current 
competency level in the items listed below as it relates to a CBRNE environment (Table 
2)? 
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Table 2.   Current Competency (Self-Rated) 
 
Area 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
N=13 
Media Management      3.6 
Legal Statues and 
Authorities  





      
2.9 
State and Local 
response 
procedures 








     
3.3 
a. Purpose   
The purpose of this question was to assess the perceived knowledge that 
the FCOs thought that they possessed in the same specific CBRN competencies asked in 
question one.  They primary research goal was to have the FCO do a self- assessment of 
their own attributes and then compare and contrast the results from question one and 
question two to ascertain if a delta exists between what the FCOs think is important for 
success in a CBRN environment and what attributes they currently possess.  From the 
comparisons and contrast of the aggregate findings in both questions, an inference could 
be made that additional attention to the measured attributes would be beneficial.  And 
since the gap between desired knowledge and derived knowledge is being defined by the 
FCO themselves, the validity of the gap contains an even greater research value. 
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b. Analysis 
The results of this question demonstrated the lack of competency 
credibility, when gauging the competencies listed, the FCOs felt they possessed.  It was 
surprising to note that not one of the competencies warranted a 4 or 5 average score; all 
ranked 3 or below, with both legal statutes and authorities and interoperability of federal 
agencies ranking in the score of 2.  This data reveals, by their own admission, a clear 
deficit in the perceived readiness of the FCOs to manage operations where the listed 5 
competencies are concerned. 
3. Question 3 
Question: How important is having technical knowledge of CBRN agents and 
impacts to an FCO assigned to manage in such an environment (Table 3)? 
 
 
Table 3.   Importance of Technical Knowledge 
    0                             0                                  4                               9 
 
Not at All              Not Much                  Somewhat                     Very 
 
a. Purpose  
The purpose of this question was to determine the value that FCOs placed 
on having technical competencies.  The running debate within the emergency response 
discipline has been whether those who manage disaster should have technical knowledge 
or just have the ability to access technical knowledge from internal or reach-back sources 
should that knowledge be required. Technical knowledge includes a variety of things, 
such as how to operate CBRN instrumentation for certain surveys, how to interpret 
contamination plume projection products, and how to conduct decontamination 
operations.  On one side of the spectrum, the argument supports advanced technical 
knowledge as a precursor for better tactical and strategic performance.  On the other end, 
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technical knowledge is seen as a competency that should be reserved for the technician, 
which allows the leaders to focus on the broader objectives and leadership requirements.  
The task was to quantify where on this spectrum the FCOs believed an FCO should be, 
and from that evidence determine how much emphasis future FCO and FEMA training 
and exercise opportunities should be devoted toward improving technical competencies 
for FCOs. 
b. Analysis  
The measured results from this question seem to run counter-intuitive 
from what the common literature suggest.  The majority of literature would suggest that 
senior leaders do not need to possess great technical knowledge but should count on 
others to provide that insight when and as required. The suggestion is that senior leaders 
only need to know where to locate the expert to be able to answer whatever technical 
question the leader has at that moment.  What the results of this question reveal is that the 
FCOs want to know more about the technical aspects of CBRN.  They felt that having 
this knowledge and not having to just depend on the technicians will make the FCO much 
better prepared to manage his own leadership requirements. 
4. Open-Ended Questions 
In an effort to expand the input and to gain a personal perspective that was not 
limited to the questions asked, a couple of open-end questions were used to determine if 
key words or common themes would emerge in the responses. Open-ended questions are 
questions that require more than a simple yes or no answer. They allow people to 
elaborate and this can create and grow a conversation.127 
A key open-end question presented was:  How is responding to a CBRN event 
different than responding to a “normal” or “traditional” disaster declaration?  As is 
evident by the use of the words “normal” or “traditional” it was understood that those key 
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words would not have universal meaning, and that some respondents may label an event 
normal when that same event may be not carry the same nomenclature in the mind of 
another individual.  Yet, even with this noted ambiguity, the question was important to 
the body of this research because it allowed for a free expression of comments vice the 
structured rank order of the previous questions listed. 
a. Analysis 
As expected the results provided from the open-ended question was 
numerous and various.  Below (Table 4) is an example of some of the key word and 
phrased responses provided 
Table 4.   Frequency of Key Words and Phrases  
Key Word (s) or phrase frequency 
International event 1 
Long-term recovery 2 
Every government agency will be involved 1 
The speed of the event 2 
Exceed local capacities 1 
Public fear and concern 4 
Decontamination requirements 2 
Heavy political oversight 1 
Need for specialized emergency workers 1 
Need to relocate 1 
Staff protection issues 1 
Staff reluctant to deploy 1 
 
The most striking research observation from reviewing the above list is the 
fact that most of the responses deal with external verses internal concerns.  The FCOs did 
not answer with items that related to their competencies, knowledge, skills, or abilities, 
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but rather they responded with items that describe the external environment that they 
would have to manage.  Public fear and concern was the most used term followed by 
long-term recovery, the speed of the event and decontamination requirements. 
In designing the question, the term environment was purposely omitted 
because the thought was that the word may lead the FCO to think externally verses 
internally.  It seems that even though great lengths were taken to avoid such a focus, the 
FCOs still moved toward that direction. The research thus suggests that when asked a 
question even without specific guidance to respond based on external or internal 
variables, the FCOs seem to gravitate toward a description of the external items first. 
D. PHASE II (SURVEY OF SEASONED FCOS) 
1. Question 1 
Question: How important to the success of an FCO is knowledge in the below 
















Table 5.   Success and Knowledge 




      
4.5 
Legal Statues and 
Authorities  






     4.625 
State and Local 
response procedures 
 





     4.0 
 
a. Purpose  
The purpose of this question was to assess the relative importance the 
FCOs placed on knowledge in specific CBNE competencies.  The competencies where 
selected based on collaboration with the Director FCO Operations Office. In addition, the 
competencies were selected because of the cross-section representation of total 
knowledge, and the decision that having superior knowledge in the five areas described 
would be a great predictor of success for an FCO assigned to respond to a CBRN event.  
It is recognized that other competency indicators could have been chosen, but as a 
snapshot of relative skill sets, the five depicted serve a valuable purpose. 
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b. Analysis 
The seasoned, more experienced FCOs listed knowledge in 
interoperability as the highest valued area of concern.  The knowledge of other federal 
teams ranked the lowest; a factor contributing to this outcome is that the seasoned FCOs 
have all been appointed to lead several presidentially declared disasters and have first-
hand knowledge of the complexities in even minor flooding events.  This adds the 
uncertainty and the even more complex nature of a CBRN environment,  and highlights 
even more the need to act in a cooperative manner across the federal, state, and local 
partnerships. 
Table 6.   Current Competency  Related to CBRNE (Self-Rated) 




      
3.625 
Legal Statues and 
Authorities  





      
2.125 
State and Local 
response procedures 
 







      
2.0 
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2. Question 2 
Question: On a scale of 1-5, with 5 being very competent, rate your current 
competency level in the items listed below as it relates to a CBRNE environment (Table 
6)? 
a. Purpose  
The purpose of this question was to assess the perceived knowledge that 
the FCOs thought that they possessed in the same specific CBNE competencies asked in 
question one.  They primary research goal was to have the seasoned, experienced FCOs 
do a self- assessment of their own attributes and then compare and contrast the results 
from questions one and two to ascertain if a delta exists between what the FCOs think is 
important for success in a CBRNE environment and what attributes they currently 
possess.  From the comparisons and contrast of the aggregate findings in both questions, 
an inference could be made that additional attention to the measured attributes would be 
beneficial.  And since the gap between desired knowledge and derived knowledge is 
being defined by the FCO themselves, the validity of the gap contains an even greater 
research value. 
b. Analysis 
As with the newer FCOs' responses, the results of this question 
demonstrated the lack of competency credibility; when gauging the competencies listed, 
the FCOs felt they possessed.  It was again surprising to note that not one of the 
competencies warranted a four or five average score; all ranked below three, with the 
only item to rank in the threes: the media.  This is quite understandable since all of the 
seasoned FCOs have had to do media interviews while being assigned to their various 
disasters. This data again reveals, by their own admission, a clear deficit in the perceived 
readiness of even the seasoned FCOs to manage CBRN operations where the listed five 
competencies are concerned. 
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3. Seasoned FCOs 
Question: How important is having technical knowledge of CBRN agents and 
impacts to an FCO assigned to manage in such an environment (Table 7)? 
 
Table 7.   Importance of Technical Knowledge 
    0                             0                                  12                              6 
 
Not at All              Not Much                  Somewhat                     Very 
 
a. Purpose   
The purpose of this question was to determine the value that FCOs placed 
on having technical competencies.  The running debate within the emergency response 
discipline has been whether those who manage disasters should have technical 
knowledge or just have the ability to access technical knowledge from internal or reach-
back sources should that knowledge be required.  On one side of the spectrum, the 
argument supports advanced technical knowledge as a precursor for better tactical and 
strategic performance.  On the other end, technical knowledge is seen as a competency 
that should be reserved for the technician which allows the leaders to focus on the 
broader objectives and leadership requirements.  The task at hand was to quantify where 
on this spectrum the FCOs believed an FCO should be, and from that evidence, determine 
how much emphasis future FCO and FEMA training and exercise opportunities should be 
devoted toward improving technical competencies for FCOs. 
b. Analysis   
As with the newer FCOs, the measured results from this question seem to 
run counter-intuitive from what the common literature suggests.  As stated earlier, the 
majority of literature suggests that senior leaders do not need to possess great technical 
knowledge but count on others to provide that insight when and as required.  Having 100 
percent of the seasoned FCOs who returned their surveys annotate that technical expertise 
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in CBRN is either somewhat or very important gives great cause for concern when 
looking at the current way the FCOs are being trained. These results suggest a disconnect 
between the prevailing thought as detailed in the literature and what the actual action 
officers are thinking. 
4. Seasoned FCOs 
Question: List of key word(s) or phrase and number of times offered by different 
respondent (Table 8). 
 
Table 8.   Key Words and Frequency 
Key Word (s) or phrase frequency 
FEMA expertise is limited 3 
Long-term recovery/contamination concerns 4 
Unknown hazard 1 
Political oversight 5 
Exceed local capacities 1 
Public fear and hysteria 6 
Decontamination requirements/pressures 4 
Normal rules do not apply 2 
National focus immediately 1 
Safe zones 1 
“Worried-well” concern 1 
Several layers of complexity tied to disaster 2 
 
The salient research observation gleaned from reviewing the above responses was 
how as was the case with the new FCOs, the seasoned FCOs also took an external 
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approach and listed responses that are externally measured  verses any responses dealing 
with introspection and looking at any qualities that an FCO might require. In addition, 
many of the responses to the open-ended question were the same with the newer FCOs 
and the seasoned FCOs. For instance, the public fear and hysteria theme was again noted, 
as was the mention of contamination. The most glaring difference was that the seasoned 
FCOs noted political oversight as a concern,   Since many of the seasoned FCOs have 
been involved in several major disasters their understanding of the political implications 
of disaster response in a CBRN environment was much keener than the newer FCOs—as 
to be expected.  
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS REVIEW OF THE COLLECTED EVIDENCE 
OVERVIEW 
1. Findings 
The evidence, in aggregate, suggests that it is difficult at best for any select group 
of individuals, in this case the FCOs, to possess all of the competencies necessary to 
manage events in a CBRN environment.  An examination of the data collected in this 
limited and focused survey reveals the following key insights:  
• Finding 1:  There was not much of a difference in the responses of the 
newer FCOs and the seasoned FCOs on the questions of what they thought 
should be the competencies of an FCO with regards to CBRN. 
• Finding 2:  Both survey groups indicated that there is a distinct gap 
between the competencies they perceive are necessary to manage in a 
CBRN environment and the competencies they currently possess. 
• Finding 3: Both survey groups indicated that the ability (or inability) to 
manage the media would be a very challenging aspect of a CBRN 
response. 
• Finding 4: Both survey groups saw having technical expertise as an 
important factor for FCOs in CBRN events. 
• Finding 5: The current system in place have left FCOs unprepared for a 
CBRN event. 
• Finding 6: Both survey groups ranked public fear and hysteria as major 
concerns. 
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2. Implication of the Findings 
Not only will additional training, technical assistance, and expertise be required, 
but also the institutionalization of a more decentralized organizational architecture will be 
needed to ensure critical decisions in a CBRN event are made at the lowest level possible, 
or better stated, the level closest to the situation, thereby freeing the FCOs to concentrate 
on the more strategic decisions.  By reviewing the responses to the variety of questions, 
the common theme that surfaced was that the FCOs did not respond with a high degree of 
confidence as to their current state of preparedness to respond to events involving CBRN 
materials.  This fact, in turn, places FEMA in a situation of having key leaders not being 
fully prepared for a possible disaster scenario.  In addition, a disaster scenario that could 
have catastrophic implications for the American public if the response and recovery 
efforts are not done in a competent manner.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This survey represented the first time the FCO cadre has been asked to respond to 
questions concerning their competencies in CBRN events.  What was telling was the 
similarity in the responses from both the new and the seasoned FCO groups.  Their 
responses indicated their understanding of the complexities of a CBRN response and an 
understanding that their current level of preparedness to lead a response is not adequate, 
and that they are aware of this situation.  They concur that more training in CBRN 
competencies is needed. Table 1, of Chapter VI, lists the FCO CBRN-E Core 
Competencies, as listed in the FCO CBRN-E Tiered Qualification Plan.   
The FCOs did not identify the need for organizational decentralization or the 
requirement for an additional team dedicated to CBRN, nor was they asked those 
questions specifically.  The survey was geared toward individual competency verses 
organizational competency.  In future research FEMA’s organizational competency 
should be accessed from the FCO perspective.  The review of the literature, in particular, 
gave rise to the notion of increased decentralization as being a more effective means to 
provide disaster assistance in CBRN catastrophic events. The next chapter takes the  
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FCOs’ surveys and combines them with the research of FEMA and CBRN to produce 
three key recommendations that, if adopted, will ensure that the FCOs are better prepared 




This chapter presents a series of three distinct solutions that, if adopted, would not 
only increase the effectiveness of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) cadre in CBRN 
environments, but would also directly aid in the readiness posture of FEMA and the 
federal government as a whole to support the state and locals in such environments.  The 
National Response Framework is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating 
structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation.128  This set of 
recommendations goes further and seeks to not only accomplish the mandate inherent in 
the NRF, but also to establish and align a new set processes, which are FCO-centric, and 
ensuring that the nation is better served by the federal government should a CBRN event 
occur. 
The recommendations are designed to address three aspects of the FCO function 
as a “system.”  The first is the internal system,129 or how the FCO can become better 
prepared to manage in CBRN environments through direct personal concentrated actions.  
The second highlights the external system130 or how the FCO could be placed in a more 
efficient response system and organization to be directly responsive to the needs of a 
chaotic, hectic population affected by a CBRN attack.  The third and final 
recommendation is geared toward indentifying a way to provide the FCO with a team of 
dedicated staff members to first consolidate CBRN competencies and then to act as a  
                                                 
128 DHS, National Response Framework, 1. 
129 The internal goal is defined as the business culture, operating environment, and workforce within 
FCO Operations. Extracted definition from the Office of Federal Coordinating Officer Operations Strategic 
Plan 2008-2013, October 2008, 2. 
130 The external goals address FCO Operations’ interaction with stakeholders from across FEMA, 
DHS, the federal government, and the emergency management community, with an emphasis on 
cooperation and coordination. . Extracted definition from the Office of Federal Coordinating Officer 
Operations Strategic Plan 2008-2013, 2. 
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catalyst to dispense the knowledge and provide more decisive coordination of all 
response systems and entities that will be present if or when a CBRN attack occurs in the 
United States. 
1. Three Key Recommendations 
Based on the findings from this research three recommendations are presented.  
These recommendations are designed to compensate for the lack of FCO CBRN training 
currently being provided, the slow nature of decisions due to a linear organizational 
structure, and the lack of a dedicate team of CBRN experts to support the FCO. 
The recommendations are as follows: 
1. Full implementation of the Draft Federal Coordinating Officer Tiered 
Qualifications Plan (TQP).   This move will begin to eliminate the noted 
gap between the skill-sets the FCOs think are important to CBRN 
response and recovery, as detailed in the survey herein, and the skill-sets 
and competencies the FCOs now possess.  The TQP is designed to provide 
all the FCOs with a basic level of CBRN expertise and to ensure a handful 
of FCOs have a greater level of CBRN expertise and have developed 
relationships with others in the CBRN community.  
2. Decentralization of command and control. Even with the TQP fully 
implemented, a fundamental change in the organizational structure and a 
re-examination of the way complex disasters, as a CBRN would be, needs 
to be addressed.  The rigidity of the current linear command and control, 
top-down, management structure needs an overhaul and to be replaced 
with a more trust-centric, decentralized management configuration that 
allows for decisions to be made more quickly and more effectively by the 
personnel that are nearest to the situation. 
3. The establishment of an Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT)-
CBRN.  Other agencies have come to the conclusion that a CBRN event is 
unique enough to require a different set of response principles and a 





mind with its JTF-CS131 and the WMD-CST132 teams.  Both concepts 
have evolved over time and have given the DoD a perspective on CBRN 
operations that is unique among other agencies.  The DoD has a support 
role in the conduct of CBRN operations in their role of defense support to 
civil authorities (DSCA).  FEMA’s role in a CBRN is major with 
coordinated management responsibilities with the FBI, other law 
enforcement entities, and state and local governments.  With such a high 
profile role in CBRN response, FEMA needs to do more to ensure the 
leadership and the agency as a whole are ready to live up to what is 
expected by the American public. 
The implementation of either one of the three items above will enhance the 
capability of FEMA and the FCOs to management the complexities of a CBRN event.  
Adoption of all three items would demonstrate to the Congress and the response 
community a true dedication to CBRN readiness and to establish FEMA as a forward-
looking, forward-thinking agency that is ready to meet new challenges with innovative 
solutions. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 1 
Recommendation 1: Adopt and implement the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Director, Federal Coordinating Officer Operations, Federal Coordinating 
Officer, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Explosive (CBRNE) 
Tiered Qualifications Plan (TQP)-dated April 2008- as soon as operationally feasible. 
                                                 
131 Joint Task Force Civil Support plans and integrates DoD support to the designated primary federal 
agency for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive consequence 
management operations. (Definition of Joint Task Force Civil Support from the Joint Task Force Civil 
Support (JTF-CS), “Welcome to Joint Task Force Civil Support http://www.jtfcs.northcom.mil [accessed 
November 10, 2008]) 
132 The WMD civil support teams were established to deploy rapidly to assist a local incident 
commander in determining the nature and extent of an attack or incident; provide expert technical advice 
on WMD response operations; and help identify and support the arrival of follow-on state and federal 
military response assets. They are joint units and, as such, can consist of both Army National Guard and 
Air National Guard personnel, with some of these units commanded by Air National Guard lieutenant 
colonels.  (Global Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/wmd-cst.htm [accessed November 10, 2008]). 
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1. History of the TQP 
The FCO cadre is the one cadre in FEMA that will be present at every disaster 
declared by the President of the United States.  Just as in the ICS terminology, at every 
incident, the command function which sets objectives and priorities for the event is  
always present and the rest of the command and general staff may be resourced 
depending on the situation.133  If the President signs a disaster declaration the FCO will 
assigned. 
The FCOs are trained in the operational aspects of various types of disaster 
scenarios from hurricanes to earthquakes and they also have ample, proven experience in 
those environments.  As has been detailed in this thesis, a CBRN event is unique 
requiring more and different leadership competencies for the FCO to be adroit at 
negotiating the eventual pitfalls. Section 209 of the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) requires federal coordinating officers within areas 
affected by a major disaster or emergency to serve as a primary points of contact for and 
provide situational awareness to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security.134  To be able to satisfy this mandate the FCOs will need to be well-versed in 
the intricacies of CBRN and the environment produced by CBRN affects.  The Draft 
TQP was first initiated in calendar year 2005 (prior to PKEMRA, of course) but the 
events of hurricane Katrina sidetracked the draft’s momentum.  The initiative was 
resurrected in 2007 with the directions of PKEMRA in mind; the draft TQP was updated 
and adjusted for the fluidity of the changes in the CBRN discipline, and a new draft TQP 
is under consideration as of the date of this writing. 
2. The Purpose of the TQP 
The purpose of the Federal Coordinating Officer CBRN-E Tiered Qualification 
Plan is to develop and implement a systematic procedure to ensure the Federal 
                                                 
133 National Response Team, Incident Command System /Unified Command (ICS/UC) Technical 
Assistance Document, 23, http://www.nrt.org/Production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachmentsByTitle/SA-
52ICSUCTA/$File/ICSUCTA.pdf?OpenElement (accessed November 11, 2008). 
134 Congress, Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, section 209.  
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Coordinating Officer (FCO) cadre is equipped with the requisite core-competencies and 
skill-sets to manage response and recovery operations as a result of threats or actual 
events involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives (CBRN-
E) materials/agents.135  The draft TQP is the only document in FEMA that addresses 
CBRN from the FCO perspective and details the steps to ensure the FCO cadre obtains 
the requisite leadership and technical skills to be effective in their assignments. The 
document was developed to provide a tiered approach to getting and keeping the FCOs 
ready to operate successful in CBRN-E events, and is the first focused plan of its type 
that highlights one set of possible disaster environments and treats the responding actions 
uniquely than other more common disaster events. 
3. The Main Tenants of the TQP 
The TQP is predicated on three pillars that help to form the foundation of the 
movement toward a FCO cadre that is truly in a position to deal with a CBRN event. 
The three pillars are listed below: 
• All FCOs will have a working knowledge of the managerial challenges 
likely to be present at a CBRN-E event and will be trained to the Tier III 
CBRN-E Basic Level.  The cadre will receive awareness level training on 
a periodic basis consistent with the threat challenges.  The training will be 
basic yet comprehensive.  It will reflect the most current doctrine and 
information available and it will be of a nature as to inspire the FCOs to 
seek independent learning opportunities to further their level of 
expertise.136 
• Certain FCOs will be trained to the Tier II CBRN-E Advanced Level.  The 
FCOs designed as “CBRN-E Advanced” will receive advance training 
beyond the awareness level and may attend in-resident courses to have 
interactions with other professionals in the federal, state, and local 
emergency management community.  The training will be current, 




                                                 
135 Federal Coordinating Officer Operations, FEMA, “Federal Coordinating Officer CBRN-E Tiered 
Qualifications Plan (TQP),” (draft developmental document version 5, FEMA, Washington, D.C., April 28, 
2008), 3. 
136 FEMA, “Federal Coordinating Officer CBRN-E Tiered Qualifications Plan,” 4. 
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operational readiness consistent with the evolving threat challenges, and 
will include federal, state, local, tribal, and private industry 
perspectives.137 
• Possible Tier I CBRN-E designation is reserved for future development as 
required.138The debate over a Tier I designation is still undecided.  Terms 
such as “master” and “expert” levels have been discussed but found to 
connote a level of utility that at this moment the FCO cadre is unwilling to 
commit.139 
4. List of FCO CBRN-E Core Competencies to be Developed 
The table below lists the core competencies that have been determined to be 
predictive of an FCO having success at managing the federal response and recovery in a 
CBRN environment.  The survey presented in the research put forth in Chapter IV of this 
thesis utilized these six competencies as the vector points (see Table 9).  The table is not 














                                                 
137 FEMA, “Federal Coordinating Officer CBRN-E Tiered Qualifications Plan,” 4. 
138 FEMA, “Federal Coordinating Officer CBRN-E Tiered Qualifications Plan,” 5. 





Table 9.   List of FCO CBRN-E Core Competencies 140 
CBRN-E Core Competencies – above and beyond current FCO training 
(a)  Understanding of the effects and hazards associated with a CBRN-E event 
(b)  Ability to manage FEMA roles and responsibilities in concert with federal, state, and 
local legislation, directives, regulations, and instructions 
(c)  Knowledge of the salient coordination and managerial challenges uniquely present in 
a CBRN-E environment 
(d)  Knowledge of the unified command structure and applying the principles of NIMS 
and the NRF in a CBRN-E event 
(e)  Understanding what specific products to request and how to utilize the products 
produced for critical decision making 
(f)   Mastery of the operational and political relationship with the PFO and other agency 
leads operating in a CBRN-E event  
 
                                                 
140 FEMA, “Federal Coordinating Officer CBRN-E Tiered Qualifications Plan,” 8. 
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The planned protocol is to have the FCOs attend training courses and participate 
in various tiers of CBRN exercises in order to develop the above competencies and to 
remain current or become more proficient.  The TQP contains a listing of CBRN specific 
courses that addresses each competency. Each course is reviewed based on the listed 
course objectives to determine if the course objectives coincide with the competencies 
listed in Table 9.  Once it is determined there is a match between the core competencies 
and the course objectives, the course is added to the training plan and the designated FCO 
is provided the opportunity to attend.  This will be an on-going process as it is anticipated 
that both the competencies listed and the courses being offered will evolve due to time 
and operational necessity. 
5. Limitations to Implementation 
There remain two very real obstacles to the full implementation of the TQP that 
have their roots firmly embedded in the robust mission of FEMA.  As a result of the Post-
Katrina Act, FEMA is the DHS component charged with leading and supporting the 
nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, 
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.141  With such wide-ranging 
responsibilities and a limited full-time staff, FEMA is forced to budget its resources to 
include the assignment of FCOs to what could be viewed as non-essential responsibilities 
because events such as CBRN, though are seen as catastrophic, are not common place.  
Therefore, in reference to the TQP, both the agency’s operational tempo and the 
commitment to execute are both challenged by the rigors of everyday requirements. 
6. Operational Tempo 
The operational tempo for the FCO cadre over the past few years have been very 
active.  The FCOs are no longer only being deployed as the lead federal manager 
pursuant to a presidential disaster declaration, but they are now also being deployed in 
support roles on larger events.  For instance when hurricane Ike rolled across Texas and 
                                                 
141 GAO, Observations on DHS’s Preparedness for Catastrophic Disasters, 7. 
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Louisiana in the summer of 2008, over eighteen members of the FCO cadre was deployed 
in those two states.142  The FCOs were assigned duties such as operations section chief, 
city and county liaisons officer, and area field office manager.143  In these capacities the 
FCOs are being utilized as special project officers and troubleshooters for hot spots 
during a disaster. By using the limited FCO resources in such a strategy it does not 
provide adequate time for the members to be assigned to other pressing functions and 
assignments such as CBRN. This is why the tough decision of resource allocation is so 
important, and why the FCOs ability to manage disasters in a CBRN environment should 
be a key factor in making such decisions.  The consequences of the FCOs not being ready 
and an attack occurring is very high on the negative scale. 
7. The Commitment to CBRN 
For the TQP to be successful a conscience decision must be made at the highest 
levels of FEMA to commit the personnel, time, and resources toward ensuring the FCOs 
and therefore the agency is prepared to manage in CBRN events.  This decision has not 
been forcefully made.  The tyranny of the urgent still guides FEMA’s business cycle to 
include the commitment of resources. As an operational imperative, FEMA tends to react 
to larger scale disasters by sending all of its available forces to engage the events in that 
particular state.  If the TQP is to be effective and the CBRN posture of the FCO cadre 
elevated then a more concrete commitment to allow the FCOs time to develop and 
nurture the competencies listed in Table 10 will have to be made.  
                                                 
142 Kenneth Clark, “Hurricane Ike After-Action Report,” (presentation given at the 14th FCO Retreat, 
Lansdowne, VA, November 3-7, 2008). 
143 Clark, “Hurricane Ike After-Action Report.” 
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C. RECOMMENDATION 2 
Develop a more decentralized organizational structure for CBRN. 
1. The Need for a More Decentralized CBRN Response Management 
Structure 
To make decisions and influence the flow of actions at the lowest organizational 
level possible, a new disaster response mindset is required to marry-up with the structure 
change recommended herein.  The mind-set suggested is similar to the concept of a 
mega-community.  A mega-community as defined for this discussion is a collaborative 
socioeconomic environment in which business, government, and civil society interact 
according to their common interest, while maintaining their unique priorities.144  It is 
further recommended that the FCO cadre is uniquely positioned to facilitate such a sea-
change. 
As discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis, the CBRN emergency management, 
disaster response environment is not a static milieu where decisions are effectively made 
in a customary linear organizational construct.  These types of complexities (occurrences 
like CBRN responses) are really at the heart of challenges faced by leaders today, and 
dealing with complexity on this scale introduces new challenges.145  And of course, new 
challenges almost always demand a new way to look at the existing landscape.  In this 
case, a more critical investigation into the way decisions are typically made in disaster 
situations is applied to a CBRN event.  What is required are leaders who know how to 
identify the vital interest they share with others, who are prepared to seek benefits from 
which all can gain, and who are committed to addressing these issues.146 
                                                 
144 Reginald Van Lee, et al., Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business, and Non-
Profits can Tackle Today’s Global Challenges Together (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 232. 
145 Ibid., 10.  
146 Ibid., 16. 
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2. Discrepancies in FCO CBRN Competencies 
A quick look at the survey results reveals that the FCOs understand that there are 
many aspects of a CBRN environment that they, as a cadre, simply do not have a great 
level of comfort in managing.  They understand the issues are salient, yet at present they 
are not in a position where they could say they are confident.  If one does not have the 
requisite capacity to handle an issue, the best approach is to seek out those whom they 
can leverage to forge a more complete partnership to be able to, as a team, complete the 
task.  The concept of mega-communities is an idea that will help leaders (FCOs) cope 
with the challenges created by the global dynamic environment (of which the fear of a 
CBRN attack is key), in part by transcending some traditional ways of thinking.147 The 
need to divest the decision making process and allow decisions to be optimized at the 
level nearest to the event is a key tenant of this new way of thinking. In the past, the 
focus has been on maximization not optimization.  Maximizing refers to a primary focus 
on the immediate benefits to, in this case, the leaders/FCOs’ own domain while 
optimizing refers to the recognition and actualization of benefits to the larger system as a 
whole.148  In this new way of thinking the focus of attention is no longer just the Joint 
Field Office (JFO) but the entirety of the affected area with decisions being made by 
federal, state, local, tribal, and other stakeholders in a collaborative fashion at every level 
where the decision is required to be made. 
3. Assessing the GAP Analysis as a Mega-Community Tool for Greater 
Decentralization 
The current FEMA GAP Analysis as defined below is an example of how some 
quasi-mega-community principles can be operationalized: 
Under a Gap Analysis Initiative rolled out this Spring (2007), a Gap 
Analysis Tool was developed in coordination with the State of New York 
Emergency Management Office/New York City Office of Emergency 
Management and has been implemented to provide FEMA and its partners 
at both the State and local levels in the hurricane prone regions of the 
                                                 
147 Van Lee et al., Megacommunities, 18. 
148 Ibid., 82. 
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country a snapshot of asset gaps at the local, State and National levels. 
Seven critical areas are incorporated for review in the tool: debris removal, 
commodity distribution, evacuation, sheltering, interim housing, medical 
needs, and fuel capacity along evacuation routes. The FEMA regions and 
corresponding hurricane prone states/territories and local communities 
have been conducting meetings to discuss capabilities and gaps for 
responding to hurricane disasters.149 
This same approach applied to CBRN and using CBRN metrics can provide the 
initial foundation for rapport building and understanding the value of optimizing the 
resources of all stakeholders that will be required to jointly respond to any substantive 
attack on the United States.   
4. The Quality of Field-Based Decision Making in CBRN Environments 
In a CBRN environment, critical decisions as discussed herein should not be at 
the purview of Washington, D.C. or even the Joint Field Office, but those decisions 
should be made by the collaborative leadership who are in direct contact with the event.  
This process will unleash a cascade of decisions that can be made quickly and in the best 
interest of the affected population.  The stakeholder decentralized conglomerate making 
the decision will have access to the same information as the JFO and the policy makers in 
Washington, D.C., only now as this new thinking is applied, they will also have the 
authority to move assets and allocate resources. 
5. Development of Decision Clusters to Interface with the FCO and JFO  
The National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the federal government 
will work to create an environment in which state, local, and private entities can best 
protect the infrastructure they control.150 This has been and is being accomplished with 
the insertion of the Protective Security Advisors (PSA), who are now embedded in every 
state.  What is suggested in this thesis is to take this same approach but one step further 
and develop a mechanism for the same level of state and local control exerted over the 
                                                 
149 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Disaster Response Assets and Enhancements,” Media 
Release Archive, http://www.fema.gov/media/archives/2007/061207.shtm (accessed October 3, 2008). 
150 White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 69. 
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infrastructure to be applied to the protection of the jurisdiction’s population. While the 
government’s collaborative arrangements have proven adequate for a variety of natural 
disasters, the threat of terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
weapons with potentially catastrophic consequences demands new approaches, a focused 
strategy, and a new organization.151 
6. Design of a Decision Cluster 
It is suggested from the research herein that a decision cluster would be developed 
at the local level and designed similar to the military forward observer concept.  In the 
military, a forward observer operates with front line troops and is trained to adjust ground 
or naval gunfire and pass back battlefield information. In the absence of a forward air 
controller, the observer may control close air support strikes.152 
The decision clusters would be a group of individuals at the local level nearest to 
the disaster situation involving CBRN who would examine the situation and call to the 
JFO and state emergency operations center (EOC) for resources to meet the requirements 
of that situation.  These resources would be above the capability of the incident command 
to bring to bear.  Once the request was received, the resources would be pushed to the 
location in the quantity and quality as detailed by the formal request. 
7. Decentralization Put into Action 
The findings in the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned was 
“spot on” when it stated, “While we have built a response system that ably handles the 
demands of a typical hurricane season, wildfires, and other limited natural and man-made 
disasters, the system clearly has a structural flaw for addressing catastrophic events.”153  
One of the structural flaws is inherent in the current centralized organizational structure 
which is used for disaster response and incident management alike. The current approach 
to leadership and readiness for CBRN response highlights a structure that is top down 
                                                 
151 White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 77. 
152 Department of Defense, “Forward Obsever,”About.com: 
http://usmilitary.about.com/od/glossarytermsf/g/f2576.htm (accessed: November 8, 2008). 
153 Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Chapter 5, 52. 
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driven.  The emphasis and the training are at the highest level in the response structure 
only without regard to the field level; it is in fact linear.  By examining the organizational 
structure below (Figure 2) as found in the NRF, the inferences are that decisions are made 
within the JFO unified coordination group and, therefore, in the FEMA system the CBRN 
specific decisions when made are also made there. 
FEMA JFO Integration
 
Figure 2.   Organizational Structure (Centralized) 154 
The best use of the Incident Command System (ICS) is when single agencies 
respond to single emergencies.155  ICS is designed to be an all-hazards approach to how 
responders tactically respond to events on the ground.  It provides for a consistent 
methodology to handle response environments both large and small. The same holds true 
for the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which is the current national 
standard that expanded the use of the ICS beyond the fire service to all responding 
agencies.156  It is interesting to note that the ICS has been expanded to other disciplines, 
                                                 
154 DHS, National Response Framework, 63. 
155 Eric Holdeman, “Who’s in Charge?” Emergency Management 2, no. 3 (2008): 31. 
156 Ibid. 
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beyond the intended audience is that of first responders.  There are now ICS solutions for 
such areas as schools and hospitals. Even businesses have started using the ICS to handle 
crisis situations.157  The emergency response community is grasping for straws to figure 
out a more effective way to conduct response operations.  They have defacto settled on 
the ICS and partially, if not wholly due to federal mandate which, of course can be 
influenced by providing federal funding. 
A more appropriate approach is consistent with looking at new ways to increase 
efficiencies.  This can be achieved by rejected the linear model and concentrating on the 
spaces between the linear lines.  Allow conversations and collaborations, discussions and 
decisions between all aspects of the organizational chart.  This is the type of 
organizational structure that FCO will require when navigating a CBRN event (see Figure 
3 below). 
Note:  The lines represent decisions being made throughout the structure without regard 
to who is higher or senior.  Similar to the synapses of the human brain firing at will and 
at random but producing a functional human being that does not have to consciously  
think and contemplate every decision of life. 
                                                 




Figure 3.   Organizational Structure (Decision Cluster- Decentralized) 
In the example, the clusters are groupings of federal, state, local, tribal, and 
private sector officials.  These officials individually or collectively are empowered to 
access resources.  If a need arises, the requirement is quickly resourced by the closets 
level of responder nearest to the need.  This activity of ordering resources is similar to the 
actions of an agency representative in the ICS.  An agency representative (agency rep) is 
an individual assigned to an incident from an assisting or cooperating agency who has 
been delegated authority to make decisions on matters affecting that agency’s 
participation at the incident.158  Each cluster would mobilize the required support to 
achieve success—be it operations, planning, finance and administration.159   What 
decentralization advocates is allowing the ability to move assets to a much lower level 
than what is currently established and to trust those individuals, groups, and collaborative 
clusters to make the proper decision. In such a system the FCOs or JFOs would not be the 
                                                 
158 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Review of ICS 100 and 200” (2006) 
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major entity that commanded the resources and commodities such as ice, water, 
protective tarps, but the decision cluster would be that command and control element to 
order and send the resources to the exact location where they are needed most. 
Leadership in the twenty-first century is no longer linear and, therefore, the 
approach to preparations and organization must also not be linear.  This is achieved by an 
innovation in thinking and by understanding that an effective leader is one that knows 
how to maximize the efforts and talents of those assigned with him/her.  This is even 
more important in a CBRN environment where the event is so complex that one person 
could not possibly have the capacity to understand all the implications. 
What is advocated is a non-controlled, seemingly chaotic structure, but produces 
decision makers and quick reaction force projection at every level of the continuum.  
CBRN is that one obvious environment where it is unique enough to demanded 
decentralization.  As was evidenced by the survey results in Chapter IV, the FCOs simply 
do not have the requisite capacities to manage an entire event and therefore leveraging 
others through decentralization becomes paramount to success.  In the decentralized 
organizational template above, the people at all levels are trusted with the understanding 
that they, at their level, understand better what is required than the staff at a JFO would. 
When people have trust, they have a heightened confidence in one another’s intention and 
actions, and when they have commitment, they are willing to override personal self-
interest in the interest of the company (agency or organization).160 By its very design, 
decentralization allows the talents and abilities of each participating member to be 
utilized at the level in which they are engaged.  The members of the decision cluster are 
allowed to concentrate on their area of concern/jurisdiction and the senior leaders, such as 
the FCOs, are afforded the opportunity to look at the entire event from a strategic 
perspective without being tied to the mechanics of the tactical movement of simply 
truckloads of commodities such as the ice, water, and protective tarps discussed 
previously.  In short, by implementing a decentralized methodology, the FCOs can focus 
on the big picture issues instead of the little, minute details. 
                                                 
160 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 182. 
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8. Sources of Expertise to Serve within Decision Clusters 
The United State has a plethora of vocations and occupations where the skill sets 
and core competencies of planning and operations have been taught.  What is required is 
simply a refinement of those individual competencies and apply them to resource 
allocations in a CBRN environment.  The below occupations are examples of people who 
would require little training to be able to be effective cluster managers or members to 
interface with the FCO, Unfired Coordination Group, and the JFO to provide better just 
in time resources in CBRN environments: 
• National Guard 
• Civil Air Patrol 
• Coast Guard Auxiliary 
• Retired first responders (fire, police, medial) 
• Retired military officers and enlisted 
9. Implementation of the Cluster System 
The federal government is increasing providing the resources for state and local 
communities to be better prepared for disasters. One such example is the Citizen Corps.  
The Citizen Corps was created to offer Americans the opportunity to volunteer to protect 
their communities through emergency response and preparation.  More than 100 
communities, ranging from major metropolitan areas to small suburban and rural 
communities, have formed Citizen Corps Councils to coordinate local volunteer activities 
to support first responders.  More than 38,000 individuals from all 50 states have signed 
up online to participate in one or more of the federally supported Citizen Corps 
programs.161 
Here, this thesis proposes  the development of the CBRN Decision Cluster Corps 
in the same vein as the Citizen Corps Councils.  The CBRN Decision Cluster would be 
trained by the federal government and would be exercised periodically in CBRN, 
                                                 
161 White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 104. 
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resource allocation, and general command relationships and authorities. The clusters 
would be mobilized by either state or local officials and would have a direct line of 
contact to the Joint Field Office. State and local officials would appoint a Decision 
Cluster Coordinator (DDC) who would be responsible for managing the program.  In 
addition the DCC would keep a roster of trained cluster members and would ensure all 
clusters had a minimum number of trained, proficient members at all times. The basic 
dilemma or challenge in organizing for homeland security is to develop complementary 
systems that avoid duplication and ensures essential requirements are met.162  The CBRN 
Decision Cluster Corps does exactly that be aligning the responsibilities to the level of 
government that does each best in CBRN environments.  The federal government has the 
resources and the state and local governments are better suited to know exactly what is 
needed where because they are closets to the situation.  The FCO is the integral part of 
the equation because he or she will be the President of the United States’ direct 
representative responsible for providing the funding mechanism to allow the resources to 
move from federal direction to state/local/cluster implementation. FCOs will have to be 
trained on the nuances of this new level of collaborative interface and exercise to ensure 
the validity of the protocols. 
D. RECOMMENDATION 3 
For  FEMA to develop and establish an incident management team- chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (IMAT-CBRN) to take the federal lead in the 
preparedness, response, recovery, and management of CBRN events. 
1. The Rationale for Establishing a FEMA IMAT-CBRN 
The House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina found that DHS and FEMA 
lacked adequate trained and experienced staff for the response and the readiness of 
FEMA’s national emergency response teams was inadequate and reduced the 
effectiveness of the federal response.163 Therefore it stands to reason that an attempt 
should be made to develop teams and systems that will more effectively be able to 
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manage the catastrophic events such as hurricane Katrina and a CBRN.  The federal 
government has a long history of responding to hurricanes; yet even with such extensive 
experience, the collaborative response system failed during Katrina.  The federal 
government and the collaborative response system has yet to be tested in a major CBRN 
environment, and to think the current teams and structures which failed at responding to a 
common164 hurricane scenario would fare better during an uncommon CBRN event 
would be stretching common sense. A the course of action that should be examined and 
considered is the development of a dedicated FEMA team lead by an FCO to be 
responsible specifically for CBRN events. 
2. Precedent in Establishing CBRN Centric Teams 
This comprehensive approach has as its fulcrum the development of an Incident 
Management Assistance Team (IMAT) - CBRN that would concentrate an entire support 
structure to both steady-state and operational CBRN specific activities.  The approach 
described herein is similar to the course of action pursued by the Department of Defense 
when faced with the similar reality that CBRN responses are dissimilar to both standard 
warfare and traditional defense support to civil authorities missions.  In response to the 
need the DoD established a Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS).   
3. The JTF-CS as a Guidepost 
The Joint Task Force Civil Support, with headquarters in Virginia, provides 
command and control for Department of Defense forces deployed in support of the 
primary agency managing the consequences of a domestic chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive situation. In the incident area, JTF-CS 
accomplishes its mission by acting upon approved requests for assistance and mission 
assignments that DoD receives.165 This impetus to deploy the JTF-CS is the same 
                                                 
164 Though hurricane Katrina was a larger event, it was still a common scenario that FEMA and the 
designated states train towards on a consistent basis and have done so for many years. 
165 Joint Task Force Civil Support, “Core Principles of JTF-CS,” 
http://www.jtfcs.northcom.mil/About_JTFCS/Core_Principles/Core_Principles.html (accessed November 
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impetus to activate FEMA’s response teams- upon request from the appropriate state, 
local, or tribal officials.  The primary mission authority allowing the Department of 
Defense and JTF-CS to engage in domestic consequence management operations is the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121 et 
seq). The Stafford Act authorizes the President to provide disaster and emergency 
assistance to state and local governments upon receipt of a request from a governor. 
Deployment of JTF-CS, at the direction of the commander of U.S. Northern Command 
and on the authority of the Secretary of Defense, would occur only after a governor 
request federal assistance from the President, and after the President issues a Presidential 
Disaster Declaration. 166  In contrast, FEMA, being lead by an FCO in the field has the 
primary authority to manage the federal response and recovery, yet the investment to 
ensure the proper personnel, infrastructure, or mission posture has yet to be made. 
4. Key Driving Factors Supporting the Need for an IMAT-CBRN 
As listed below, several key reasons drove this conclusion to the forefront to 
include: 
• FCO leadership alone may not be able to ensure tactical readiness across 
response and recovery disciplines 
• FCOs are the key leaders, but leadership is a filter and others within the 
command and general staff would also require definitive CBRN focus that 
at present is not being provided 
• The challenges of a CBRN environment is so different that a more 
concentrated knowledge and experienced federal team to lead the 
innovations may be required 
• Turnover rate and constant changing of FCOs will make it difficult to 
maintain competencies 
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• State and local knowledge gaps in CBRN will be large and having only 
one FEMA person, the FCO, trained (as per the FCO, CBRN TQP) is not 
good enough to ensure adequate federal support, but rather having an 
entire team which can fold upon the state and local apparatus and provide 
support is more appropriate. 
• A seasonal hurricane or other large event would remove the small cadre of 
FCOs from operational consideration. Having a dedicated 24/7 IMAT-
CBRN ready to deploy for specific events regardless of the operational 
tempo caused by other natural disasters or manmade events is value added.  
If not involved in a CBRN event, then this dedicated team would not be 
engaged but rather remain in a training and exercise posture to prevent the 
dilution of its focused capabilities. 
5. Leveraging of Current IMAT Development Processes 
Currently FEMA is in the process of establishing both national and regional 
IMAT teams.  The primary mission of a FEMA IMAT is to rapidly deploy to an incident 
or incident-threatened venue, provide leadership in the identification and provision of 
federal assistance, and coordinate and integrate inter-jurisdictional response in support of 
the affected state(s) or U.S. Territory(s). The IMATs will support efforts to meet the  
emergent needs of state and local jurisdictions; possess the capability to provide initial 
situational awareness for federal decision-makers; and support the initial establishment of 
a unified command.167 
As the IMAT concept at FEMA remains in its infancy, it would be prudent at the 
same time as the development of notional IMATs are being discussed and implemented 
to also develop an IMAT-CBRN to concentrate on the unique CBRN environment.  The 
JTF-CS has subject matter experts on staff in a variety of fields to enable the organization 
to perform missions in CBRN environments to include experts in medicine and chemical, 
biological, radiation, nuclear and explosive weapons.  The entire staff recognizes the 
special considerations of operating in CBRNE terrorists incidents.168    The goal of  
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establishing the IMAT-CBRN would be similar to that of the JTF-CS, only it would be 
geared toward the federal integration with state and local resources in keeping with the 
mission of FEMA. 
The current IMAT force structure calls for 26 members to be on the team.  With 
the IMAT-CBRN, these 26 members would all be trained and focused on CBRN 
response doctrine, again similar to the JTF-CS, and would be the lead federal support 
entity to state and local officials in such environments.  The Department of Defense made 
the commitment to CBRN competencies by establishing the JTF-CS; FEMA can do the 
same with the IMAT-CBRN.  Precedence has been set.  It is ironic that the agency with 
the largest consequence management coordinating role in a CBRN event, FEMA, has 
little capability while the agency with always a supportive role; DoD has great capacity 
with the JTF-CS structure. 
E. CONCLUSION 
None of the three recommendations detailed herein are difficult to implement.  
They are all rather straightforward and logical.  As a group, they intersect the gambit of 
response and recovery systems that the FCO is habitually exposed—both internal and 
external.   
If a CBRN attack were to occur today, it is doubtful that the highly professional 
and motivated FCO cadre would have the wherewithal to provide the level of leadership 
and management that is expected.  
The experts are sounding the alarm. Regarding the nuclear threat, former Senator 
and current Co-Chair and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative Sam Nunn testified that 
“The threat of a nuclear attack is a real and present danger, and yet we are doing an 
insufficient job in defending against this new threat.” 169  Dr. Matthew Bunn of Harvard 
University’s Kennedy School of Government agreed, saying that nuclear terrorism is a 
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very real possibility.170  In the official Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism report it was stated that “A nuclear, 
chemical or biological weapon in the hands of terrorist remains the single greatest threat 
to our nation.  While progress has been made in securing these weapons and materials, 
we are still dangerously vulnerable.”171   
The threat is clear and present; the FCOs will be at the tip of the response and 
recovery spear.  The question remains, will they be ready?  By adopting the 
recommendations set forth herein, the answer will be a resounding, yes! 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
Although this research shed light on a very important homeland security issue, 
FCO leadership and capabilities in CBRN environments and how the FCOs can be better 
prepared to handle such challenges, there remain additional aspects of the national 
response and recovery from CBRN events that require further illumination.  First and 
foremost, this research focused exclusively on the Federal Coordinating Officers.  By 
design, the FCOs were highlighted as the lead federal manager during a disaster declared 
from a CBRN event.  Still, for a clearer picture of the status of CBRN response 
capabilities within the United States, additional research focusing on other response 
partners such as the State Coordinating Officers172 would be appropriate.  Do the SCOs 
require similar training in CBRN competencies as the FCOs?  What additional training or 
organizational changes benefit the SCOs?   
Another key area that could use additional scrutiny is bureaucratic 
decentralization as a novel concept.  A further examination of leadership and efficiencies 
in organizational performance at the federal, state, local, and tribal level with respect to 
chaotic events such as CBRN, would benefit the discourse of how decentralization can 
lead to increased efficiencies in CBRN events.  The question remains do these same 
levels of government possess both the will and the capabilities to make such a paradigm 
shift?  Will they step up to the plate and become skillful contributors to the decision 
cluster concept presented herein?  Are they content with the status quo?  Is 
decentralization truly a viable approach not only on paper but in the field?  In other 
words, how best can this concept be operationalized? 
The FCO self-examination process is subject to additional clarification.  In this 
research the FCOs were asked to evaluate themselves subjectively on certain CBRN 
competencies. A deeper more objective look at FCO competencies could shed more light 
on the issue. Additional research into the way FCOs perform in CBRN related exercises 
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and the competency gaps would go a long way to determining the true nature of FCO 
leadership in CBRN environments absent a real event. Do what FCOs say really mirror 
their performance?  Is there a more concrete method to judge expected CBRN 
competency? 
Valuable research could continue looking at the uniqueness of responding to 
CBRN events verses everyday disaster situations.  From this comparison and contrasting, 
interpolating and extrapolating an even greater understanding of the need to pursue 
CBRN as a distinct response and recovery discipline might subsequently emerge.  
Chapter VI of this thesis identified certain key CBRN leadership competencies, but are 
there others?  Can these other competencies be identified, codified, and trained to?   
This research touched on the issue of bureaucratic inertia—the resistance to 
change and to give up both power and control. The FCOs exists in a world inhabited by 
bureaucrats.  Is there a better way to direct such change? Can organizations such as 
FEMA truly change? And if so, what are the best ways to influence such change?  If not, 
how can the resistance to change be offset to ensure operational readiness in CBRN 
events? 
Finally, the concept of the IMAT-CBRN requires further study.  Is it beneficial to 
devote such staff, equipment, and other resources to a capability that may not be utilized 
in an actual event? If there is not a CBRN attack, then in what activities will the team be 
engaged?  CBRN has been identified as low probability but high consequence (LPHC) 
events.  Unlike traditional hazards, LPHC events are rare occurrences.173  In this era of 
cost constraints, is an IMAT-CBRN a valuable investment of scarce resources? Can the 
current JFO structure be modified to perform the same work as the IMAT-CBRN without 
the added expense? 
This research is a first step in truly isolating tangible ways to ensure the Federal 
Coordinating Officers are prepared to respond to CBRN events.  By looking at the FCO 
function as a system it allowed for making specific recommendations in each distinct area 
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of that functional system: the internal, the organizational, and the support.  As FEMA 
adopts the recommendations herein and continues to research more efficient ways to be 
engaged in emergency management, the entire national CBRN response and recovery 
posture is enhanced.  Consequently, if the U.S. (as a nation) shows potential terrorists that 
it are ready—as a community and as a nation—then are the terrorists less likely to believe 
that their attack can achieve all of its destructive goals?174 Other research in this area is 
both warranted and welcomed. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report contained a 
very critical finding.  The report states, “While we have built a response system that ably 
handles the demands of a typical hurricane season, wildfires, and other limited natural 
and man-made disasters, the system clearly have structural flaws for addressing 
catastrophic events.”175 The Federal Coordinating Officer as the person appointed by the 
President of the United States is the key federal part of the noted system, and the 
consequences of a medium to large scale CBRN attack on American soil would be 
defined as a catastrophic event.  The report goes on to add: 
Under the current framework (The National Response Framework), the 
federal government merely coordinates resources to meet the needs of 
local and state governments based upon their request for (that) 
assistance… yet this framework does not address the conditions of a 
catastrophic event (CBRN) with large scale competing needs, insufficient 
resources, and the absence of functioning local governments.176   
Basically, this report is an indictment and a condemnation of the current system 
now in place to deal with the large scale, mega events such as a CBRN incident. 
This thesis provides a path forward and a departure from the conventional group 
think.  It first addressed the Federal Coordinating Officers as a key function within the 
federal response tool chest.  It examined the current status of FCO CBRN competency 
readiness and made concrete suggestions as to how to improve the readiness and remove 
some key capability gaps. 
The thesis also looked at the current response organization.  A case was made that 
the current linear approach to response and recovery for large scale CBRN events is 
inadequate.  The research advocated for a more decentralized response and recovery 
system and the institutionalization of decision clusters where critical, time sensitive 
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decisions would be made jointly by the people nearest to the situation in question. In 
hurricane Katrina, federal officials struggled to perform responsibilities generally 
conducted by state and local authorities.177  By the institution of the decision cluster 
concept all responsibilities become shared, and the affixing of blame for failure becomes 
joint.  Each level of government, federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector, all work 
together seamlessly to ensure resources are ordered and allocated for the betterment of 
the victims.  This type of organizational refinement at the grassroots level, supported by 
the FCO and SCO at the JFO, is the type of nexus partnership that the challenges of a 
CBRN response will demand.   
Incumbent in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 is an 
important amendment to the Stafford Act. The amendment states that the Robert C. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (Stafford Act) is amended to authorize the 
President in a major disaster to provide accelerated federal support in the absence of a 
specific request and expanded assistance to state and local governments in recovery.178  
The impetus for this amendment was predicated on the fact that the resources required at 
the point of service (POS), at the local level, were not arriving in a timely manner.  This 
amendment is designed to remove some of the bureaucratic red tape that sometimes 
slows down resource allocations.  The decision cluster described herein is designed to do 
exactly that- remove the red tape and get the needed resources to the POS on time and on 
target. 
The research also looked at the development of an FCO lead CBRN-IMAT.  The 
unique nature of the CBRN threat, the environment, and the level of preparedness in 
other organizations such as the Department of Defense with its JTF-CS, lead to the 
conclusion that FEMA, given its critical role as the lead in managing the federal response  
to the consequences of a CBRN event, needs to be on par with other agencies and have a 
dedicated, professional, full-time team to concentrate on the specifics and nuances of 
CBRN response and recovery. 
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In conclusion, the failure of local, state, and federal government to respond more 
effectively to (hurricane) Katrina—an event which had been predicted in theory for many 
years, and forecasted with startling accuracy for five days—demonstrates that whatever 
improvements have been made to the  capacity to respond, the U.S. is still not fully 
prepared.179  In theory, many experts and statesmen alike predict that the United States 
will be attacked by a terrorist using CBRN weapons, and when it happens the 
consequences will be catastrophic.  When this happens, the Federal Coordinating Officer 
will be once again in the spotlight.  The general assumption from the public is the FCO 
will be prepared, well-trained, have the right organizational structure, and have the proper 
support staff to be successful.  The current research contained herein does not reach that 
same conclusion.  More is needed to prepare the Federal Coordinating Officers to manage 
effectively in CBRN environments.   
The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism recently 
stated that it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a 
terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.180 Yet, most Americans have 
little concern that they or their families will be a victim of such terrorism.181  The Federal 
Coordinating Officers who will be called on to respond to an attack do not have the 
luxury to not be concerned.  They must be concerned, ready, and diligent. 
Tangible, proactive steps are presented as recommendations in this thesis.  It is 
hoped that the tenants of each recommendation be dissected and discussed in a serious 
fashion.  The FCOs are a motivated, willing, and ready cadre of professionals; they just 
need the right tools to do the job right. 
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